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Redefining Harm, Reimagining
Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic
Violence Law
Margaret E. Johnson'
Civil domestic violence laws do not effectively address and redress the
harms suffered by women subjected to domestic violence. The Civil
Protective Order ("CPO") laws should offer a remedy for all domestic
abuse with an understanding that domestic violence subordinates women.
These laws should not remedy only physical violence or criminal acts. All
forms of abuse - psychological, emotional, economic, and physical - are
interrelated. Not only do these abuses cause severe emotional distress,
physical harm, isolation, sustained fear, intimidation, poverty,
degradation, humiliation, and coerced loss of autonomy, but, as
researchers have demonstrated, most domestic violence is the fundamental
operation of systemic oppression through the exertion of power and
control. Because CPOs are effective in rebalancing the power in a
relationship and decreasing abuse, this remedy should be available to all
women subjected to all forms of domestic violence. This Article proposes
recrafting the civil law to provide a remedy for all harms of domestic
violence and its operation of systemic power and control over women. Re-
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centering the narrative of domestic violence on this oppression rather than
merely physical violence and criminal acts underscores the critical role of
women's agency and autonomy in legally remedying domestic violence.
Too often, outside actors choose to save women's lives to the exclusion of
effectuating women's choices about their abusive relationships.
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VANESSA

Mark restricts Vanessa's access to money and employment. At home,
Mark keeps all household supplies and toiletries under lock and key. If
Vanessa or her three children need anything they must prove it is
necessary; and only then will he unlock a cabinet and provide them with
it. This includes tooth paste. Tampons. Laundry detergent. At dinner,
Mark tells the children to ignore their mother because Vanessa is too
stupid to be able to understand their conversations. Instead, Mark tells
them she is there simply to make the food and serve it. Privately, Mark
often tells Vanessa that if they ever separated, the children would never
choose to live with her because they do not respect her. 1
KIM

For years, Eddie has subjected Kim to name calling and degrading
insults on a daily basis. "Kim says she has often wished it would get so
bad that Eddie would turn phYSically violent - so she'd have 'a reason to
get out."'2
SUSAN

Susan stands at attention. Her husband Ulner reclines in a living room
chair. Ulner has ordered their son to videotape the entire encounter.
Ulner tells Susan, "Look at me bitch. You play those stupid games with
me, I'll knock your teeth outta your face. You act like a **** in front of
the kids. You little slut. If I see a dog chewing your ass up I won't stop it.
I won't stop it. I don't want to see your stupid ass crooked self. You stupid

I Vanessa is a fictional name but her experiences are based on real women I have
represented.
2 The Oprah Winfrey Show, Emotional Torture, http://www.oprah.com!tows!
slidel200410/2004100S/slide_2004100S _10 l.jhtml (last visited July 22, 2008).
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ass heifer." He directs his son, "Zoom in on that heifer. Zoom in. Do you
see a tear?" VIner then yells at Susan, "You don't know what to do. Look
at your stupid ****. Look at the way you look!" What prompted VIner
to say these things? Susan had come in to ask VIner what he wanted for
lunch and VIner accused Susan of provoking him. Later, he threw her on
the bed in their room and slapped, hit, and attempted to strangle her while
still demanding their son to videotape. 3
INTRODUCTION

Vanessa, Kim, and Susan were all subjected to domestic violence,
including systematic hitting, degradation, humiliation, threats,
coercion, and financial deprivation. Nonetheless, the law fails to
recognize much of the brutality of their experiences. As a result,
women like these often will not seek a legal remedy. 4 Kim believes
there is no remedy for Eddie's emotional abuse without physical
violence. And without a civil remedy, Mark's control over the
monetary resources and his control of Vanessa's ability to seek

3 Kristin Pisarcik, Behind Closed Doors, Abuse Caught on Tape, ABC NEWS, July 31,
2007,
http://abcnews. go .comlPrimetime!story ?id=2608738&:page= 1
(language
excluded from original source). On October 26, 2006, the ABC News show 20/20
originally aired Susan's story. 20/20 reported that for years, a 47-year-old woman
identified only as Susan had been subjected to abuse by her husband, Ulner, with
whom she had three children. Id. In the videotape Ulner forced his son to film, Ulner
engaged in "verbal flogging" of Susan for a prolonged period of time. ABC News
obtained this videotape and showed it on the air along with interviews of Susan. For
perhaps the first time, systematic emotional and psychological abuse were seen and
undeniable to the American public. And although Ulner had also subjected Susan to
physical abuse, Susan only told the authorities about all of the abuse to which Ulner
subjected her after this videotaping incident because he had involved the children in
his humiliation of her. See also notes regarding the posted video of the original
broadcasted story (on file with author).
4 This paper focuses on women subjected to male-perpetrated domestic violence
because the research shows that it is the most prevalent type of domestic violence. See
Joan B. Kelly &: Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner
Violence: Research Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476,
481-82 (2008) (identifying women more often harmed than men by "Coercive
Controlling Violence," which is physical and emotional violence characterized by
power and control). This focus should not serve to ignore the fact that women also
perpetrate domestic violence and that domestic violence occurs in same-sex
relationships. Id. In addition, this Article draws on early feminist thought regarding
domestic violence. The inclusion of this theory is intended to highlight the broad
theories of subordination and not to maintain an essentialist view of women as white,
middleclass, and straight.
See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Polities, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241,1242 (1991).

2009]

Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies

1111

employment will continue, further entrenching Vanessa's economic
dependence on him. In addition, Mark will continue to alienate the
children from their mother. In most states, only Susan has legal
systematic recourse under the civil domestic violence laws, known as
civil protective order ("CPO") laws. While Susan may obtain a CPO
for the physical abuse to which she is subjected, in most jurisdictions
Susan will have no remedy for the emotional and psychological abuse.
She cannot obtain an order requiring the return of the videotape,
enjoining the name calling, degradation, and future video recordings,
nor receive other relief necessary to address the wide range of her
husband's abusive behavior. A comprehensive civil legal system that
tackles the fundamental harms of domestic violence must prOvide
Vanessa, Kim, and Susan with equal access to the potential benefits of
the CPO laws to address serious multifaceted abuse.
CPO laws, which exist in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, permit petitioners to obtain orders addressing the abuse in
their relationships.s These statutes provide expedited hearings and
relief. 6 The relief available includes injunctive relief, such as ordering
the cessation of abuse, counseling, or limitations on physical or other
contact between the parties; family relief, such as custody and child
support; and monetary relief, including compensation for resulting
medical or psychological treatment. 7 CPO hearings also aid women
simply as a forum where women may hold their abusers accountable. s
In addition, CPOs can provide evidence for legal actions seeking more
permanent relief, such as permanent custody and visitation. 9 In
addition to actually decreasing abuse, studies have shown that women
believe protective orders are effective tools in their relationships. 10
The civil system thus enables the petitioner to rearrange her
relationship with the person abUSing her.ll That rearrangement has
5 The CPO laws are discussed in more depth infra Part I.D. Although individual
state laws differ, generally all contain a definition for actionable domestic violence or
abuse and provide various remedies to address the abuse. Id.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 106-13.
7 The remedies available under CPOs are explained at length infra text
accompanying notes 111-13.
B See infra Part I.C
9 See infra Part H.C
10 See, e.g., Jane Murphy, Engaging with the State:
The Growing Reliance on
Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11]. GENDER, Soc. POL'y &: L. 499, 513
(2003) (noting protective order petitioners cite satisfaction with temporary protective
orders); infra Part I.C
11 PETER FINN &: SARAH COLSON, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT
COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 33 (1990) (stating that judges find CPOs effective
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legal authority and legal ramifications if disobeyed. This allows the
woman to avoid the harm of abuse while deciding whether and how to
maintain her relationship with her abuser.
Unfortunately, two-thirds of the states limit CPO remedies to those
who are subjected to physical violence 12 or other criminal acts under
state law. This narrow view of actionable domestic violence deprives
women like Vanessa and Kim of a remedy. Although they were
subjected to serious nonphysical abuse,13 including psychological,
emotional, and economic abuse, the laws generally make a meaningful
civil remedy unavailable to them. 14
The law's narrow focus on physical violence even deprives women
subjected to comparatively nonsevere physical abuse of a remedy. For
example, women like Susan, who have a legal remedy for their
physical abuse under the plain language of the statute, may be de facto
excluded from relief because the court does not classify the domestic
violence as life threatening. 15 If physical violence is not considered
severe enough, some courts are wary to provide any remedy at all,
preferring not to meddle in private relationships. 16 The courts'
if order includes all statutorily permitted relief petitioner needs to protect against
future abuse given her particular situation).
12 For a discussion of the CPO laws' fixation on physical violence, see Jeffrey R.
Baker, Enjoining Coercion: Squaring Civil Protection Orders with the Reality of Domestic
Abuse, 11 J.L. &: FAM. STUD. 8,43-44 (2008).
13 Rather than using the term "battered women" or "abused women," I am using
the construction "women subjected to abuse" which I take from Ann Shalleck's
important work, Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship
Between Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L.
REV. 1019, 1023-28 (1997). As Shalleck discusses, labeling any woman who has been
abused as a "battered woman" reduces her to a unidimensional view, defined by what
happened to her. Id. at 1023. The same is true for the terms "abuser" or "batterer"
that reduce that person to what he did alone. These labels remove the complexities of
their relationship, of which the violence and abuse may be a large or small part - a
constant background or an intermittent piece. With a narrow focus, the solutions or
remedies for the harms resulting from the abuse are driven only by that focus rather
than the broader reality of the woman's life.
14 This Article discusses and critiques the current regime of CPO laws in the 50
states and the District of Columbia and their underinclusion of the types of domestic
violence that should be actionable.
15 See infra Part II.B.3. In a related discussion of courts acting based on their own
assumptions about violence, see Tamara L. Kuennen, "No-Drop" Civil Protection
Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence
Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 65 (2007) (discussing how courts deny women
petitioners' motions to vacate protective orders thus treating them wholly differently
from other civil injunction matters due to courts' assumptions and biases about
violence and their focus on saving lives).
16 See, e.g., Mary Ann Dutton &: Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner
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reluctance to pry and limited remedies mean that courts often will
refuse to hear testimony of the full context of abuse, including
nonsevere physical abuse, psychological abuse, emotional abuse, and
economic abuse.
If the CPO system allowed them, however, women like Vanessa and
Kim, who are subjected to exclusively psychological, emotional, and
economic abuse, and like Susan, who are subjected to all forms of
abuse, might satisfactorily address their complex abuse. Research
shows that the systematic operation of power and control is at the
center of most abuse and that all forms of abuse are interrelated. 17
CPO laws provide an important offset to an abuser's power with
injunctive relief. Injunctions are court remedies intended to reorder
'''a relationship in conflict' in which the authority and power of the
court are placed at the service of the victim to compel someone else the violator - to respect the victim's rights."IB Accordingly, when
allowed, women subjected to abuse have used CPOs to satisfactorily
decrease their physical, psychological, and emotional abuse. 19
Decreasing psychological abuse is important for two reasons. First,
research shows that women who are abused find psychological abuse
more painful than physical abuse. 20 Second, some research has
shown that psychological abuse, when effectuated by a controlling
partner, often leads to physical abuse. 21 Because CPOs are potentially
effective in decreasing nonphysical abuse, CPOs can also potentially
change the dangerous power dynamics of a relationship before
physical abuse is inflicted. As a result, women subjected to the
fundamental harms of psychological, emotional, and economic abuse
should be able to seek a CPO.
The current CPO laws are particularly well situated to permit
petitioners to construct a remedy that redefines a relationship that is
tainted by abuse but nonetheless is meaningful - connected by
Violence: Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 754 (2005) (arguing for
psychological research to study domestic violence as coercion and thereby to move
beyond "accounting of specific assaultive acts"); infra Part II.B.
17 See infra Part l.A.
18 Kuennen, supra note 15, at 54-55 (citing Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to
Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts; 64 TEX. L. REV.
1l01, 1101 (1986)) (emphasis added).
19 Janice Grau et ai., Restraining Orders for Battered Women: Issues of Access and
Efficacy, 4 WOMEN & POL. 13, 19,21-25 (1984).
20 ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATIERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 66 (2000)
(noting women "frequently describe the threats and verbal abuse as more devastating
than the physical"); LENORE WALKER, THE BATIERED WOMAN 34 (2d ed. 2000).
21 See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 4, at 483.
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children, economics, emotional, and psychological ties. 22 Accordingly,
CPO laws should provide for remedies that permit a multidimensional
reordering of the relationship, from the terms of the legal relationship
to a recalibration of the power dynamic.23 Permitting women to
reconstruct relationships in which there is multifaceted abuse fulfills
the goal of decreasing abuse by advancing women's ability to selfdirect and self-define, otherwise known as their agency or autonomy.24
By exerting agency, women subjected to abuse rebalance the power in
their relationship and decrease future abuse. 25
Accordingly, CPO laws should provide redress for all forms of
domestic abuse to attack the oppression of women. This Article
expands on existing scholarly assessment of the law's influence on
domestic violence. 26 This Article focuses on the need for the civil law
22 See ALYCE D. LAVIOLETTE &: aLA W. BARNETT, IT COULD HApPEN TO ANYONE:
WHY BATTERED WOMEN STAY 145 (2d ed. 2000); NAT'L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE,
DECADE FOR CHANGE REPORT 8, IS (2007); SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 77-78; Sally F.
Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End
the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489, 1501 n.83
(2008) (noting women subjected to abuse "want the relationship to continue but the
violence to stop" (citing ANN JONES, NEXT TIME, SHE'LL BE DEAD: BATTERING AND How
To STOP IT 203 (2000))); David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use
of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153,
1161 n.42 (1995).
23 See Baker, supra note 12, at 57 (explaining that studies show "civil protection
regimes generate relief to violence victims by affording them a lever to demand or regain
power or to be liberated from coercive oppression, by communicating defiance, by seizing
a power greater than the abuser's in the law and by exposing her oppression publicly");
Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel in Protective Order
Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. &: CN. RTS. L. REv. 557, 565-66 (2006) (focusing on only
physical violence, Professor Balos states that CPO remedies support women's autonomy in
decisionmaking about children and otherwise provide structure and organization to family
relationships while addressing safety for plaintiff and her family).
H
See generally Kathryn Abrams, Subordination and Agency in Sexual Harassment
Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAw 112-14 (Catharine A. MacKinnon &:
Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (discussing agency as "capacity for self-definition and selfdirection" despite subordination based on gender); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 150102, 1523 (stating CPOs that permit woman to continue relationship with someone
while addressing abuse is valuable to woman's autonomy within relationship).
25 Baker, supra note 12, at 57.
26 See generally EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN
PERSONAL LIFE (2007) (examining coercive control involved in domestic violence);
Baker, supra note 12 (arguing that CPO laws should enjoin coercion); Alafair S. Burke,
Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization,
75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 552 (2007) (proposing coercive domestic violence criminal law
statute); Goldfarb, supra note 22 (exploring dual CPO goals of safety and autonomy);
Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That For Sure? Questioning The
Efficacy of Legal Interventionsfor Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. P1..JB. L. REv. 7 (2004)
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to go beyond remedying physical abuse and crimes,27 beyond
recognizing only discrete acts of violence, and beyond approaching
domestic violence from the system actor's goals rather than the
woman's goals. A broader approach will allow the CPO laws to better
assist women seeking to change abusive relationships.
Part I of this Article identifies how women experience the harms of
domestic violence and how the CPO laws designed to address and
redress domestic violence fail to address some of its most fundamental
harms. Part II examines how a limited recognition of selected harms
as domestic violence hurts women subjected to abuse and underscores
the importance of redefining domestic violence in CPO laws to best
address women's goals in addressing the abuse. Part III proposes
gUidelines for how states can reform their CPO laws to address and
redress all forms of domestic violence. In discussing this proposal,
Part III explores both concerns and benefits of the proposal while
maintaining a focus on the critical role of women's agency and
autonomy in legally remedying domestic violence.
I.

CIVIL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAw'S GENERAL FAILURE TO REMEDY
THE FAR-REACHING HARMS OF ABUSE

Women experience domestic violence in a variety of forms,
including physical violence, psychological abuse, emotional abuse,
and economic abuse. These forms of abuse inflict enormous harm.
Despite these fundamental harms, the nation's CPO laws largely fail to
provide a remedy to all of them.
A.

Domestic Violence as Experienced by Women

Various researchers, advocates, and theorists who have studied and
worked with women subjected to abuse have catalogued the many
types of abuse. 28 Social science research recognizes that women are
(analyzing limitations of legal responses to domestic violence); Tamara L. Kuennen,
Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence Victims: How Much Is Too
Much?, 22 BERKELEY]. GENDER L. & JUST. 2 (2007) (examining resulting challenges
from courts considering coercion); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying
the Harm of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 ]. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 959 (2004) (arguing that criminal law needs to define domestic violence
crimes as not merely transactions of physical violence but also as pattern of power and
control being exerted).
27 Jeannie Suk's article, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.]. 2 (2006),
provides an interesting discussion and critique of the criminal law overreaching by
criminally prohibiting intimate relationships in the home.
28 See infra Part LA.
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subjected to domestic violence that is complex and multifaceted. In
social work scholarship, domestic violence is defined as
a pattern of behavior in a relationship by which the batterer
attempts to control his victim through a variety of tactics ....
These tactics may include fear and intimidation, physical
and/or sexual abuse, psychological and emotional abuse,
destruction of property and pets, isolation and imprisonment,
economic abuse, and rigid expectations of sex roles. 29
Tactics that qualify as psychological and emotional abuse as well as
economic abuse include
sabotag[ing] a woman's efforts to find a job or attend a job
training ... [by] turning off her alarm clock so she will be late
for work, cutting off her hair to cause her great
embarrassment, inflicting visible injuries or creating conflicts
before crucial events, and hiding or destroying her books,
homework, or clothing.30 Once employed, the abuse may
continue with the abuser "disrupting her transportation or
child care arrangements or harassing her at work."31

29 Judy L. Postmus, Analysis of the Family Violence Option: A Strengths Perspective,
15 AFFiLiA 244, 245 (2000); see also LENORE E. A. WALKER, ABUSED WOMEN AND
SURVIVOR THERAPY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST 56 (1994); Dutton &:
Goodman, supra note 16, at 743. It should be noted, however, that such broad
notions of domestic violence did not always exist. Traditionally, although feminists
had a broad view of domestic violence that included all forms of abuse, social
scientists defined domestic violence as only physical violence. SCHNEIDER, supra note
20, at 65. More social science research today, however, reflects an increaSingly
complex view of domestic abuse that looks at multifaceted methods of control.
Nonetheless, Drs. Dutton, Goodman, and Walker, among others, have recently
critiqued the psychology research for having failed to research adequately the
emotional abuse, psychological abuse, and coercive control. WALKER, supra note 20,
at 34 (noting that psychologiSts have never effectively quantifiably measured
psychological abuse); Dutton &: Goodman, supra note 16, at 743 (noting lack of
empiricism regarding coercive control).
30 Postmus, supra note 29, at 246.
31
ld. See generally Diane R. Follingstad et al., Lay Persons Versus Psychologists
Judgments of Psychologically Aggressive Actions by a Husband and Wife, 19 J. iNTERPERS.
VIOLENCE 916, 924-25 (2004) (using Follingstad and DeHart Psychological Abuse
Survey (2000), authors studied perceptions of following categories of psychological
abuse: "(a) treatment as inferior, humiliation/degradation; (b) isolation, restriction, or
monopolization of mobility, information, or social activity; (c) emotional or sexual
withdrawal or blackmail; (d) verbal attacks/criticism; (e) economic deprivation; (0
threats of phYSical harm or to physical health; (g) destabilizing the woman's
perception of reality; (h) use of male privilege and/or rigid gender role; 0) control of
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Social science researchers Joan Kelly and Michael Johnson identify
"coercive controlling violence,,32 as the use of patterned power and
control including the tactics identified in the social work literature. 33
As they state,
Abusers do not necessarily use all of these tactics, but they do
use a combination of the ones that they feel are most likely to
work for them. Because these nonviolent control tactics may
be effective without the use of violence (especially if there has
been a history of violence in the past), controlling violence
does not necessarily manifest itself in high levels of violence. 34
Psychologists have also catalogued many forms of abuse. One study
utilized various scales and other measurement tools to determine
whether women were subjected to domestic abuse. 35 That study
covered physical, psychological, emotional, and economic abuse. 36 Its
researchers used two scales of psychological abuse: dominanceisolation and emotional-verbal to measure its prevalence and effect on
women. 37 They used scales to measure the harm of stalking and job
personal behavior; CD jealousy/suspicion; (k) intimidation or harassment; (l) failure to
live up to role expectations"); Felicity W. K. Harper et aI., The Role of Shame, Anger

and Affect Regulation in Men's Perpetration of Psychological Abuse in Dating
Relationships, 20]. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 1648, 1651-53 (2005) (studying role of anger,
shame, and affect regulation in psychological abuse, defined pursuant to Psychological
Maltreatment of Women Inventory ("PMWl")); Vivian Zayas &: Yuichi Shoda,

Predicting Preferences for Dating Partners from Past Experiences of Psychological Abuse:
Identifying the Psychological Ingredients of Situations, 33 PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 123, 123-24 (2007) (exploring relationship between past abuse and preferences
for dating partners).
32 Another scholar argues that the interrelationship of the emotional, psychological,
economic, and physical abuse discussed by scholars and activists when addressing
domestic violence can be encapsulated in the term "coercive control." Baker, supra note
12, at 58-60. Yet another scholar discusses at length the failure of the legal system to
agree on a definition of "coercive control," thereby causing further harm. Kuennen,
supra note 26, at 2. Because this paper argues that psychological, emotional, and
economic abuse need to be surfaced, acknowledged, and remedied by the civil law, a
global term, such as "coercive control," is not used herein.
33 See Kelly &:Johnson, supra note 4, at 48l.
34

See id.

MARY ANN DUTTON ET AL., ECOLOGICAL MODEL OF BATTERED WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE
OVER TIME, FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 19-20 (2005).
36 Id.
Recently, researchers published a Scale of Economic Abuse. Adrienne E.
Adams et aI., Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
563, 569 (2008). The researchers found that economic abuse is a "significant
component of the broad system of tactics used by abusive men to gain power and
maintain control over their partners." Id. at 580.
37 DUTTON, supra note 35, at 19-20. The Tolman PMWl (1995) "asks whether
35
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interference, as well as threats and danger of fatality.38 Psychologists
have found these scales to be successful measures to identify battered
women, as opposed to women not subjected to abuse. 39 Accordingly,
these scales can distinguish domestic abuse from mere nagging or
unpleasantness.
In related work, Drs. Mary Ann Dutton and Lisa Goodman explore the
role of coercion in domestic violence. 40 They define coercion as "a
dynamic process linking a demand with a credible threatened negative
consequence for noncompliance."41 They studied nine areas of control in
which the agent (person causing the abuse) made demands on the target
(the person subjected to abuse): "[Plersonal activities/appearance,"
"support/social life/family," "household," "workJeconomidresources,"
"health," "intimate relationship," "legal," "immigration," and "children."42
The abuser followed up his demands with a credible threat to induce
compliance. The credible threats included threat of physical injury,
removing the children, interfering with immigration applications,
revealing private information, embarrassing the target, and having sex
with another person. 43 They found that while all of the coercion was
psychologically harmful, only some was physically harmful. 44
Dr. Lenore Walker measures the following as components of
psychological abuse:
harassment, controlling the woman's life,
controlling how she spends her time, questioning her, keeping her
under surveillance, depriving her of sleep at night by making
demands, and issuing orders.45 Recently, Walker has drawn parallels
between Amnesty International's definition of psychological torture
partiCIpants have experienced a variety of acts of forms of psychological abuse,
ranging from 'he swore at me' to 'he watched over my activities and insisted I tell him
where I was at all times.'"
38 DUTTON, supra note 35, at 20-21 (citing Tjaden & Thoennes Survey (2000); The
Job Interference Scale, stating that scale was based in part on work by Jody Raphael
(1996) and Raphael and Tolman (1997), which measured employment interferences
among welfare recipients and others; Threat Appraisal, stating that this scale, which
measures violent and nonviolent threats, was based on batterer-generated risks
developed by Jill Davies and others, Davies, Lynn, and Monti-Catania (1998); and
Danger Assessment Scale, developed by Dr. Jacquelyn Campbell (1995)).
39 Id. at 20 (identifying that PMWI Scale can identify battered women).
40 Dutton & Goodman, supra note 16, at 743-44; see also MARY ANN DUTTON ET
AL., DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A COERCIVE CONTROL MEASURE FOR INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT 15-16 (2005) (on file with author).
41 Dutton & Goodman, supra note 16, at 746-47.
42 Id. at 747.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 748.
45 WALKER, supra note 29, at 58-59.
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and domestic violence. 46 Under Amnesty International's definition,
there are eight areas of abuse: (1) "isolation of the victims;" (2)
"induced debility producing exhaustion such as limited food or
interrupted sleep patterns;" (3) "monopolization of perception
including obsessiveness and possessiveness;" (4) "threats such as
death of self, death of family and friends, sham executions, and other
indirect threats;" (5) "degradation including humiliation, denial of
victim's powers, and verbal name calling;" (6) "drug or alcohol
administration;" (7) "altered states of consciousness produced through
hypnotic states;" and (8) "occasional indulgences which, when they
occur at random and variable times, keep hope alive that the torture
will cease. ,,47
Walker shows how these forms of psychological torture apply to
battered women. 48 For instance, batterers conSciously isolate women
from others; women also withdraw from society to protect others from
harm and themselves from embarrassment. 49 Three times as many
battered women as nonbattered women are isolated financially
because they have "no access to cash. "50 And twenty-two percent of
women in abusive relationships (versus only thirteen percent in
non abusive relationships) have no access to a car. 51 Regarding other
controlling behaviors, Walker states that whereas battered women
were not permitted to go places three-quarters of the time,
nonbattered women were not permitted to go places only one-quarter
of the time. 52 Also, batterers, unlike nonabusive partners, knew where
their victims were at almost all times. 53
A broad view of the violence to which women are subjected is
consistent with the advocacy against domestic violence as well. The
"power and control wheel" is almost a required text for service
providers who work with women who are subjected to abuse. 54 The
wheel identifies domestic violence as the exercise of power and
control through the "interrelated dimensions of physical abuse,
economic abuse, coercion and threats, intimidation, emotional abuse
(using isolation, minimizing, denying, and blaming), and abuSing

46
47
48

49

WALKER,

supra note 20, at 35.

Id.
Id.
Id.

SOld.

slId. at 36.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54

STARK,

supra note 26, at 13.
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male privilege. "55 Therefore, when advocates work with women who
are abused, a discussion of the various forms of abuse helps the
women identify if and how they have been abused. That assessment is
also part of the process of continuing self-empowerment.
Moreover, the advocacy community similarly has translated the
theory of power and control into the concrete actions and behaviors
that result in oppression. For example, one advocacy group's website
identifies domestic violence as "a pattern of abusive behavior which
keeps one partner in a position of power over the other partner
through the use of fear, intimidation and control."56 This advocacy
group's website is similar to many others. 57 The group identifies the
following forms of abuse: phYSical, sexual, economic, emotional, and
psychological. 58 The group defines phYSical abuse as "[gl rabbing,
pinching, shoving, slapping, hitting, hair pulling, biting, etc. Denying
medical care or forcing alcohol and/or drug use. "59 It defines sexual
abuse as "[Cloercing or attempting to coerce any sexual contact
without consent, e.g., marital rape, forcing sex after physical beating,
attacks on sexual parts of the body or treating another in a sexually
demeaning manner.,,60
The group defines economic abuse as
"[mlaking or attempting to make a person financially dependent, e.g.,
maintaining total control over financial resources, withholding access
to money, forbidding attendance at school or employment."61 It
supra note 20, at 12.
WomensLaw.org, What is Domestic Violence?, http://www.womenslaw.orgl
simple.php?sitemap_id=39 (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
57 See, e.g., House of Ruth, Domestic Violence Dynamics, http://www.hruth.orgl
domestic-violence-dynamics.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (providing depiction of
power and control wheel, which shows power and control in hub; emotional abuse,
economic abuse, sexual abuse, intimidation, using children, using male privilege, threats
and isolation in spokes; and physical abuse on rim); Iowa Commission Against Domestic
Violence, Questions About Domestic Violence, http://www.icadv.orglfaq.asp (last visited
Mar. 26, 2009) ("Domestic violence is not an isolated, individual event, but rather a
pattern of repeated behaviors .... These assaults occur in different forms: physical,
sexual, psychological."); North Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Domestic
Violence Information, http://www.nccadv.orgidomestic_violence_info.htm#Definition
%20of"A,20Domestic%20Violence (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) ("Domestic Violence is
when two people get into an intimate relationship and one person uses a pattern of
coercion and control against the other person during the relationship and/or after the
relationship has terminated. It often includes physical, sexual, emotional, or economic
abuse."); Ohio Domestic Violence Network, Power &: Control, http://www.erie-countyohio.netlvictimlpdflwheel.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
58 WomensLaw.org, supra note 56.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
55

56

SCHNEIDER,
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defines emotional abuse as "[u]ndermining a person's sense of selfworth, e.g., constant criticism, belittling one's abilities, name calling,
damaging a partner's relationship with the children.,,62 Finally, the
group defines psychological abuse as "[c] ausing fear by intimidation,
threatening physical harm to self, partner or children, destruction of
pets and property, mind games or forcing isolation from friends,
family, school and/or work.,,63
The notion of domestic violence as the operation of power and
control has largely become part of mainstream consciousness. 64
Contemporary theorists and battered women's advocates underscore
the fact that power and control can be exercised not only by a pattern
of phYSical violence, but also through a pattern of psychological,
economic, sexual, and other abusive acts. 65 Physical violence may not
even be the most significant form of abuse. 66 Rather, a woman in a
relationship marked by serious power imbalances and a dangerously
controlling partner is "subjected to an ongoing strategy of
intimidation, isolation, and control that extends to all areas of a
ld.
ld. To identify emotional abuse, the National Domestic Violence Hotline asks
whether the partner does the following things:
62
63

Calls. you names, insults you or continually criticizes you. Does not trust
you and acts jealous or possessive. Tries to isolate you from family or
friends. Monitors where you go, who you call and who you spend time
with. Does not want you to work. Controls finances or refuses to share
money. Punishes you by withholding affection. Expects you to ask
permission. Threatens to hurt you, the children, your family or your pets.
Humiliates you in any way.
National
Domestic
Violence
Hotline,
What
is
Domestic
Violence?,
http://www.ndvh.orglget-educatedlwhat-is-domestic-violence (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
64 Gael Strack &: Eugene Hyman, Your Patient. My Client. Her Safety: A Physician's
Guide to Avoiding the Courtroom While Helping Victims of Domestic Violence, 11 DEPAUL]'
HEALTH CARE L. 33,35 (2007). For provocative and well-documented articles discussing
the significant problems with a monolithic and stark view of the operation of power and
control on women subjected to abuse, see Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and
Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L &: Soc.
CHANGE 191, 198 (2008) and Kuennen, supra note 26, at 2.
65 Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women:
Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 57 (1999) (noting batterers' behavior includes
physical violence, emotional abuse, psychological abuse, economic coercion, and
other controlling actions); Rhonda L. Lenton, Power Versus Feminist Theories of Wife
Abuse, 37 CAN.]' CRIMINOLOGY 305, 310-12 (1995).
66 Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L REV. 973, 986 (1995) [hereinafter, Stark, Re-Presenting
Woman Batteringl. Evan Stark's book, COERCIVE CONTROL, supra note 26, provides an
extensive exploration of coercive control.
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woman's life, including sexuality; material necessities; relations with
family, children, and friends; and work. Sporadic, even severe,
violence makes this strategy of control effective. "67 The woman's
experience of domestic violence is defined by the coercion and
deprivation of liberty as much as it is by the violence. 68
In the current legal theory literature, commentators also have
highlighted the breadth of abuse that constitutes domestic violence as
well as the importance of contextualizing incidents within the broader
dynamic of systemic coercive and abusive conduct. For instance, one
scholar asserts that although explanations for domestic violence are
divergent, empirical data supports the common explanation "that
abuse is a method of gaining and exercising power and control over a
partner. "69 This theory about domestic violence is rooted in systemic
and political issues of gender subordination and coercive control. 70
Accordingly, many legal commentators argue that it is the operation of
power and control that must define the domestic violence rather than
any specific incidents of physical violence. 71
The phYSical,

67 Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering, supra note 66, at 986; see also Coker, supra
note 65, at 57 (defining domestic violence as pattern of behavior to control victim).
68 Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering, supra note 66, at 986.
69 Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1493.
70 SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 5.
71 Linda Kelly, Stories from the Front: Seeking Refuge for Battered Immigrants in the
Violence Against Women Act, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 665, 695 (1998) (arguing exertion of
power should be focus of domestic violence study rather than number of physically
violent episodes (citing Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground, Integrating
Psychological and Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1295, 1318 (1993))); Sharon Stapel, Falling to Pieces: New York State
Civil Legal Remedies Available to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Survivors of
Domestic Violence, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 247, 255 (2007-08) (acknowledging that
communities of same sex and opposite sex couples similarly define domestic violence
as one partner coercing, dominating, or isolating other partner). Stapel states that

[ilt is the exertion of any form of power that is used to maintain control in a
relationship. The violence can be physical, emotional, sexual, psychological,
or economic. Same-sex batterers use tactics of abuse similar to those of
heterosexual batterers. However, some forms of battering are unique to the
LGBT communities. . .. Same-sex batterers are able to successfully exploit
their victims' internalized, or the community's externalized, homophobia,
biphobia, or transphobia, simply by threatening to "out" their partners'
sexual orientation or gender identity to family, friends, employers, landlords,
or other community members.

Id. at 255; see Baker, supra note 12, at 58-60; Kuennen, supra note 26, at 2; Strack &
Hyman, supra note 64, at 33 (stating domestic violence includes emotional, sexual,
economic, and physical abuse).
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psychological,72 emotional, or economic73 acts are merely the tools that
manifest the dynamics of power and control that are present in
domestic violence. Domestic violence "exists along a continuum that
includes emotional, financial, physical, and sexual violence. The
continuum of violence is unique to each person. To some, emotional
abuse is more severe than sexual abuse. To others, sexual abuse is the
ultimate human violation."74 Given the legal theory's understanding
of the dynamics of power and control in domestic violence, criminal
justice scholars recently have argued to expand the criminal law's
definition of domestic violence to incorporate such dynamics. 75
As seen above, social scientists, advocates, and legal theorists
increasingly have recognized the many harms of domestic violence.
Social science catalogues the concrete harms resulting from domestic
violence. In addition to the physical injuries that can result from
physical assaults, psychological abuse influences mental health, with
increased depression, suicide ideation, post-traumatic stress disorder,
and a decreased sense of power and self-esteem. Psychological abuse
also affects physical health, with increased substance use and
increased susceptibility to long-term diseases. 76 Economic abuse often
results in economic dependence, lack of resources, uncertain
economic future, poverty, homeless ness , and decreased physical and
mental health. 77
72 Similar to the other disciplines discussed above, the legal theory discusses
psychological abuse as including threats, humiliation, destruction of property and
pets, harassment, and forced confinement in the home. See, e.g., Goldfarb, supra note
22, at 1492 (discussing various forms of harm from domestic violence).
73 ld. (stating domestic violence includes economic abuse as well (citing jody
Raphael, Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. j. GENDER &: Soc. POL'Y &: L.
367,368 (2003))).
74 LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE
23 (2003). Mills further states that each person needs to be reflective in identifying
what forms of behavior are playful and which are coercive. ld. In addition, Mills
exhorts society to learn about each person's individual experience of interconnected
acts of violence so that society does not continue to misperceive behaviors out of
context. ld.
75 Burke, supra note 26, at 556 (building on Tuerkheimer's work and arguing for
domestic violence criminal statute that would prohibit defendant engaging "in a
pattern of domestic violence with the intent to gain power or control over the
victim"); Tuerkheimer, supra note 26, at 960-62 (arguing that criminal law needs to
define domestic violence crimes as not merely transactions of physical violence but
pattern of power and control being exerted). For a response to Burke's proposal, see
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Renewing the Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence: An
Assessment Three Years Later, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613, 616-25 (2007).
76 Adams, supra note 36, at 563-64.
77 ld. at 568.
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With this understanding of the actual scope of domestic violence, it
is clear that Vanessa, Kim, and Susan have all been subjected to
domestic violence. Mark has subjected Vanessa to coercive economic
abuse by precluding her from access to financial resources. Mark has
also emotionally abused Vanessa by systematically belittling and
degrading her in front of her children. Eddie has subjected Kim to
emotional abuse by daily degrading, insulting, and calling her names.
And Ulner subjected his wife Susan to many forms of abuse deSigned
to control Susan through fear, intimidation, and denial of her own
power. Ulner's pattern of abuse included subjecting Susan to physical
abuse, when he hit, choked, and slapped her; emotional abuse, when
he engaged in a pattern of undermining Susan's self-worth by
constantly criticizing her, belittling her, calling her names, and
damaging her relationship with her son; and psychological abuse,
when he intimidated Susan, threatened her with physical harm, and
iso la ted her. 78
B.

The Importance of Women's Agency in Responding to Domestic
Violence

Throughout all the domestic violence research discussed above,
there is a consistent narrative that domestic violence is the operation
of power and control, manifested in various forms of abuse. In the
late I960s, the United States movement against domestic violence
the connection between
organized around this same principle:
domestic violence and women's societal subordination. 79 Feminists
saw domestic abuse as part of a social order organized around male
privilege. 8o Feminists saw "[b]attering ... [as] an integral part of
women's oppression; women's liberation its solution."81

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1496; Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orioff,
Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case
Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810 (1993).
80 Linda Gordon, Women's Agency, Social Control, and the Construction of'Rights' by
Battered Women, in NEGOTIATING AT THE MARGINS 122 (Sue Fisher & Kathy Davis eds.,
1993); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and
the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237, 254
78

79

(2005). In fact, for the prior two centuries, feminists had been arguing that "women's
legally sanctioned subordination with the family denied them equality and
citizenship." Gordon, supra at 4.
81 SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF
THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 34 (1982); see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 87.
As Susan Schechter wrote:
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In their campaign to attack domestic violence, feminists highlighted
the broad range of violence against women. 82 Feminists sought
eradication of not merely discrete acts of physical violence but also of
sexual, emotional, and economic abuse. These acts, which are
ultimately about the abuser's power and control, systemically
oppressed women. 83
Accordingly, feminists saw women's exertion of their autonomy as
the best response to the domestic violence. The battered women's
movement in the early 1970s created resources to address the systemic
subordination of women. 84 Feminists, including formerly abused
women, founded shelters focused on "egalitarianism, autonomy and
self-determination. "85 The shelters valued and respected women's
choices. 86 The principle that women "need to be free to make choices
without coercion or undue persuasion by anyone" is central to the
feminist abuse treatment philosophy.87 Feminists clung to these
foundational prinCiples because they believed the shelters should
remedy any harm, including the loss of autonomy that results from

All men learn to dominate women, but only some men batter them.
Violence is only one of the many ways in which men express their sOcially
structured right to control and chastise. . .. In ... other cases men may not
need to use violence to dominate. Verbal abuse, withholding affection, or
withdrawing resources may suffice.
SCHECHTER, supra at 219. Schechter further stated, "Since male supremacy is the
historical source of battering, and class domination perpetuates male privilege, a longrange plan to end abuse includes a total restructuring of society that is feminist, antiracist, and socialist." Id. at 238. Put another way, Professor Elizabeth Schneider
states: "Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse,
particularly forced social and economical isolation of women, is also common."
SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 4. It should be noted as seen throughout this discussion
that all of the terms "domestic violence," "intimate partner violence," "battering," and
"abuse" are imperfect and do not provide one unified definition. For purposes of this
Article, the terms "domestic violence" and "abuse" are used interchangeably.
82 WALKER, supra note 29, at 56 ("The goal of woman abuse is usually to exert
power and control over the victim. Most physical and sexual abuse is accompanied by
psychological intimidation and bullying behavior used to maintain power and control
over the woman. The pattern of abuse usually has an obsessional quality to it rather
than a lack of control by the batterer.")
83 Kuennen, supra note 26, at 2 (citing, among others, Stark, Re-Presenting Woman
Battering, supra note 66, at 973-74).
84 Miccio, supra note 80, at 257.
85 Id. at 286.
86 Id.
87 Angela Moe Wan, Battered Women in the Restraining Order Process: Observations
in a Court Advocacy Program, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 606, 611 (2000).
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abuse. ss A study supporting this treatment approach shows that
women who received autonomy-respecting "support and assistance"
during a CPO proceeding "thought more positively about the
proceedings" and reported "having good social support networks,
fewer feelings of isolation, and better access to child care after
receiving assistance. "S9
Current-day feminists and battered women's advocates continue to
identify domestic violence as the exercise of power and control in a
relationship by one intimate or formerly intimate partner against
another. 90 Knowing how domestic violence operates is important in
understanding how women might succeed in decreasing it. Because
domestic violence is the operation of power and control over the
woman, it makes sense that the woman's ability to exercise agency and
autonomy within the abusive situation is related to her ability to
address the abuse. Feminist scholarship demonstrates that women
subjected to domestic violence are capable of making decisions for
themselves. Because they are in the best position to determine their
goals and the options to obtain those goals, their decisions are critical
to responding to the abuse. 91
This theme is addressed most
Miccio, supra note 80, at 286.
Wan, supra note 87, at 611.
90 Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy: Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in
Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83 OR. L. REV. 945, 958 (2004)
(noting that if partner not "sufficiently solicitous, obedient, loyal or compliant,"
perpetrator uses pattern of abuse to gain such compliance (citing David Adams,
Treatment Program for Batterers, 5 CLINICS FAM. PRAC. 159 (2003»); Dutton &
Goodman, supra note 16, at 743 (stating that" [flor decades now, battered women's
advocates have placed the notion of coercive control squarely at the center of their
analysis of intimate partner violence . . .. Violence is simply a tool, within this
framework, that the perpetrator uses to gain greater power in the relationship to deter
or trigger specific behaviors, win arguments, or demonstrate dominance. Other tools
might include isolation, intimidation, threats, withholding of necessary resources such
as money or transportation, and abuse of the children, other relatives or even pets")
(citation omitted).
91 Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women:
Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1991) (analyzing decision of leaving as being
complicated by multiple goals of battered women and their experiences of violence).
For instance, even if the woman's sole goal is to not be subjected to violence, she may
appropriately remain in the relationship because battered women experience leaving
as the most violent and dangerous time. Yet battered women also have multiple goals
beyond merely avoiding the violence, and that is economic security for themselves and
their children, love for their partner, lack of available optiOns once they leave the
relationship, and perhaps a sense that the outside world is more violent than the
relationship itself. As an example, Professor Laurie Kohn states, "While a woman may
not want to be hit, she may want and need the abusive partner to remain at home to
assist with child care .... " Kohn, supra note 64, at 216.
88
89
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consistently in the discourse regarding whether or not a battered
woman should be forced, persuaded, or steered toward leaving her
abusive partner. The early battered women's movement literature
discusses the importance of focusing not on what society thinks is best
for the woman (usually exiting the violent relationship) but instead on
what the woman thinks is best given her situation:
The advocate should not decide for a woman whether she
should leave or whether she should return to her batterer.
Only a victim herself can reach a decision on custody or on
trying counseling. Your demonstrated belief that she is
responsible, that she can work to change her own
circumstances, not merely benefit from your work, combined
with your legal skills, will help her more than will your
imposing your beliefs, desires, or schedule upon her.92
The emphasis on recognizing that the woman is the decisionmaker,
based on her own goals, is important because research shows women
are best able to determine the safest course of action for them. 93 For
instance, the research on separation assault shows women subjected to
abuse may be physically safer living with the abuser because leaving
may increase stalking, harassment, and may decrease the woman's
ability to influence him. 94 The important component in addressing

92 NAT'L CTR. IN WOMEN AND FAMILY LAw, INC., LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR BATTERED
WOMEN 9 (1982).
93 Id. at 6 (noting women hope or believe that their partner, who often apologizes
and promises to change, will in fact stop abuse; are willing to endure abuse to preserve
relationship; believe that their children's ability to maintain relationship with their
father is more important than abuse; feel or believe that they are to blame for abuse
and believe that they need to care for their partner to help end abuse; feel frustrated
with their attempts to find service providers who will assist their partner in addressing
abuse and, therefore, believe there is no alternative to continuing being subjected to
abuse; find relocating away from their partner to be financially and logistically
impossible; fear being subjected to heightened violence if they leave based on their
prior attempts to leave; fear that they would not be able to manage their lives without
their partner); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1499 (citing that U[wlomen have many
reasons for staying with or returning to violent partners, including financial
dependency, fear of retaliation, social isolation, community pressure and concern
about losing custody of children . . . a deep emotional bond with her partner and
want[ingl to preserve and improve the relationship"). And some women do not
believe the violence inside the relationship is any worse or more dangerous than the
systemic violence against women in the broader society. Martha R. Mahoney, Exit:
Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1283, 1288 (1992).
94 WALKER, supra note 29, at 55.
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abuse, then, appears to be the autonomy and agency of women
subjected to abuse.
C.

The Benefits of CPO Laws

ChoOSing to petition or not to petition for a CPO is an act of agency
by women subjected to abuse. Social science research indicates that
CPOs can be beneficial .to women seeking to address domestic
violence in their relationships. Studies show that seeking a CPO often
helps to decrease subsequent violence. 95 One study shows that many
women who obtain CPOs are more successful in preventing
subsequent psychological and emotional abuse. 96 That study shows
that women with no injuries or nonsevere injuries who obtained CPOs
believed they were effective in decreasing abuse and curtailing verbal
abuse, harassment, and physical violence. 97 Yet while CPOs might be
most effective in dealing with psychological and emotional abuse, few
CPO laws address those aspects of abuse. Other studies show that a
CPO is an effective remedy in addressing the physical violence that
courts permit petitioners to address. 98 Studies show that when courts
failed to grant valid requests for CPOs, those women were subjected to
more abuse and threats of abuse than women who received CPOs.
Still, the women whose valid requests for CPOs were denied
experienced less subsequent abuse than those women who did not
seek CPOs at all. 99

9S Julia Henderson Gist et ai., Protection Orders and Assault Charges:
Do justice
Interventions Reduce Violence Against Women?, 15 AM.]. FAM. L. 59, 67 (2001); Carol
E. Jordan, Intimate Partner Violence and the Justice System, 19]. OF INTERPERS.VIOLENCE
1412, 1425 (2004); Judith McFarlane et ai., Protection Orders and Intimate Partner
Violence: An 18 Month Study of 150 Black, Hispanic and White Women, 94 AM.]. OF PUB.
HEALTH 613, 617 (2000). But see Jordan, supra at 1425.
96 Grau, supra note 19, at 21-25. It should be noted that there are some research
limitations with the studies on CPO effectiveness and therefore, any generalizations
are undertaken cautiously. McFarlane, supra note 95, at 613.
97 Grau, supra note 19, at 24.
98 Balas, supra note 23, at 566 (citing study shOwing that women reported
decrease in violence for two years follOwing obtainment of CPO); Gist, supra note 95,
at 67; McFarlane, supra note 95, at 617 (noting that after women applied and qualified
for CPO, "a rapid and significant decline in violence occurred"); Jane c. Murphy,
Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered
Women, 11 AM. D.]. GENDER, Soc. POL'y &. LAw 501,513 (2003) (finding that women
determined that temporary protective order met some of their goals in addressing
abuse to which they were subjected by "getting the abuser to stay away, stopping the
violence, or making a reconciliation possible").
99 Gist, supra note 95, at 67-68.
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A CPO proceeding also benefits women subjected to abuse by
providing a forum to tell their stories, telling the abuser they object to
the abuse, making a public record of the abuse, and regaining some
control over their lives. lOo Women experience healing, validation, and
empowerment from having a forum to air the abuse. 101 Whereas
before her abusive partner defined her relationship, the CPO process
provides the woman with an opportunity to restructure how the
couple interacts between themselves and with their children, and how
they maintain their real and personal property, thereby changing the
power dynamics. 102
D.

Overview of CPO Laws 103

As discussed above, domestic violence is the use of patterned power
and control through many forms of abuse. It is important for women
to be able to exercise their autonomy in responding to domestic
violence, whether or not that includes seeking a CPO. For those
women who choose to obtain a CPO, there are benefits to having the
CPOs address all of these forms of abuse. Yet, as discussed below, the
vast majority of jurisdictions' CPO laws do not remedy domestic
violence unless it is physically abusive or a criminal act. Moreover,
most states do not address domestic violence as the operation of
coercive control or oppression, focusing instead on discrete acts.

100 Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for Intervention with
Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'y REV. 51, 56 (2000) (citing Karla Fischer
& Mary Rose, When "Enough is Enough": Battered Women's Decision Making Around
Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 414, 420-23 (1995».
101 See, e.g., Buel, supra note 90, at 996-97 (explaining system that permits women
subjected to abuse to tell their stories and to witness abusers being found responsible
offers healing); Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers'
Testimony Project, Women's Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 709, 756-57
(2005) (discussing benefits of women's narratives, including fact that one woman
subjected to abuse stated that being able to tell her story literally saved her life).
102 Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When "Enough Is Enough": Battered Women's Decision
Making Around Court Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 414,425 (1995).
103 It should be noted that states provide CPOs under various names, such as final
protective orders, civil protection orders, and injunctions. For ease of reference, I will
refer to all such orders as "civil protective orders" or "CPOs." Similarly, almost all
states identify domestic violence as the ground for CPOs, but sometimes call domestic
violence by other names such as domestic abuse, family violence, dating violence, and
interfamily offense. Again, for ease of reference, 1 refer to this ground as "domestic
violence" although domestic abuse is perhaps a better, more inclusive term.
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Common Features

A woman subjected to abuse can petition the court for an expedited
order addressing the abuse in her relationship.l04 Most states permit
an ex parte hearing for a temporary CPO, which remains in force for
only a few weeks until the final protective order hearing. 105 If a final
CPO is issued, it usually is also of limited duration, such as one
year. 106 But to qualify for a protective order, the petitioner usually
needs to show that she is in a qualifying relationship,107 subjected to
abuse,108 and what remedies would best address the abuse in the
relationship. 109
104 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c)(10) (2008) (providing that relief ordered by
Court may include "directing the respondent to perform or refrain from other actions
as may be appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter").
105 Klein & Orloff, supra note 79, at 1031-42; see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1004(d)(l)
(2008) (providing for I4-day ex parte temporary protective order if court finds "the
safety or welfare of a family member is immediately endangered by the respondent");
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-505(a)(l) (West 2008) (stating if "a judge finds that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that a person eligible for relief has been abused, the
judge may enter a temporary protective order to protect any person eligible for relief
from abuse"). The order can last for seven days after service. Id. § 4-505(c)(1).
106 See Klein & Orloff, supra note 79, at 1085-88 (identifying duration of different
states' CPOs, including several that permit orders to last indefinitely, few that last
three years, couple that last for two years, and over half lasting for year).
107 Such qualifying relationships may include a relationship by marriage, blood,
adoption, and cohabitation. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 79, at 814-42; see, e.g.,
D.C. CODE § 16-1001(6)(A)-(D) (2008) (defining qualifying present or past
relationship as one by "blood, legal custody, marriage, domestic partnership, having a
child in common, or with whom the offender shares or has shared a mutual
residence"). In addition, if jurisdictional requirements are met, the relationship may
also be or have been "a romantic relationship." And finally, if the person is stalked by
the offender, even without one of the above relationships, the person may qualify.
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501(1) (West 2007) (defining qualifying relationship as
"(1) the current or former spouse of the respondent; (2) a cohabitant of the
respondent; (3) a person related to the respondent by blood, marriage, or adoption;
(4) a parent, stepparent, child, or stepchild of the respondent or the person eligible for
relief who resides or resided with the respondent or person eligible for relief for at
least 90 days within 1 year before the filing of the petition; (5) a vulnerable adult; or
(6) an individual who has a child in common with the respondent").
108 See Klein & Orloff, supra note 79, at 845-76 (itemizing various criminal acts,
sexual assaults, interferences with personal liberty, threats, attempts to harm,
harassment, emotional abuse, damage to property, and stalking that constituted
domestic violence for purposes of differing states' CPOs as of 1993); see, e.g., D.C.
CODE § 16-1001(5) (stating domestic violence, called intrafamily offense, includes
any act punishable as criminal offense); MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAw § 4-501(b)(1)
(stating "abuse" includes: "(i) an act that causes serious bodily harm; (ii) an act that
places a person eligible for relief in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; (iii) assault
in any degree; (iv) rape or sexual offense ... or attempted rape or sexual offense in
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As discussed in detail below, states differ as to how they define abuse
warranting a protective order. llo The various remedies available also
vary by state and may include an order that the respondent not further
abuse or threaten to abuse the petitioner; the respondent stay away from
the petitioner and/or her residence, school, and place of employment;
the respondent not contact or attempt to contact the petitioner; the
respondent vacate a joint residence with the petitioner; the respondent
and/or petitioner participate in certain counseling or domestic violence
programs; the respondent pay for any medical expenses resulting from
the abuse; detailing safe custody and visitation arrangements for any
minor children in common; the respondent pay any necessary child or
spousal support to the petitioner; awarding use and possession of jOintly
owned vehicles and/or other personal property; the respondent
surrender any firearms; the respondent pay any necessary filing fees or
court costs; and granting any other relief that would address the
domestic violence. lll If the respondent violates the orders, the
petitioner may ask the court to find the respondent in criminal or civi1
contempt. ll2 In addition, many jurisdictions make the violation of a
CPO itself a crime.ll3
2.

All States Remedy PhYSical Violence and Most States Remedy
Criminal Acts

All of the states have statutes that prOVide for a CPO as a remedy for
domestic violence that involves a battery, assault, bodily injury, threat
of bodily injury, or placing a person in fear of physical injury.114 Most

any degree; (v) false imprisonment; or (vi) stalking"). For a full 50-state survey of the
definition of domestic violence in CPO laws, see infra Part I.D.
109 See, e.g., Klein &: Orloff, supra note 79, at 910-1006 (describing remedies
available under state CPO laws).
110 See infra Part I.D.
III See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c) (2008) (providing multiple CPO remedies,
including catch-all remedy "directing the respondent to perform or refrain from other
actions as may be appropriate to the effective resolution of the matter"); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-506(d) (West 2007) (providing several CPO remedies but not
including catch-all remedy).
112 Klein &: Orloff, supra note 79, at 1101-06; see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(f)
(mandating violation of protective order is subject to contempt); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAw § 4-508(b) (West 2007) (same).
113 Klein &: Orloff, supra note 79, at 1142; see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005(g)
(mandating violation of protective order shall be chargeable with misdemeanor
crime); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-508(a) (mandating violation of protective order
may result in criminal prosecution).
114 AlA. CODE § 30-5-2 (2008); AlASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3) (2008); ARIZ. REV.
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state statutes explicitly cross-reference the criminal code to define
these physically violent acts and other acts, like sexual assault, as
constituting actionable domestic violence. Jl5 Others reference acts
that constitute crimes, without explicitly cross-referencing the
criminal statutesY6 In general, these states offer the CPO as a remedy
for such acts whether or not there is coercive control or oppression.

STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-4-102(3) (2008); CAL. FAM. CODE §
6203(a) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2) (200S); CONN. GEN. STAT. §
46b-3Sa (200S); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 10410) (2007); D.C. CODE § 16-1001(5)
(200S); FLA. STAT. § 74l.2S (200S); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4 (200S); HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 5S6-1 (200S); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(1) (200S); 750 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 601103
(2009); IND. CODE § 31-9-2-42 (200S); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2 (200S); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3102(a) (2007); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 2132(3) (200S); 19-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40020) (200S); MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAw § 4-501 (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 209A, § 1 (2007); MICH. CaMP.
LAws § 600.2950(1) (2007); MINN. STAT. § 51SB.01(a) (200S); MISS. CODE ANN. § 932l-3(a) (200S); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.0100) (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102
(2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-9030) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.01S (2009); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1(I) (2009); N.]. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a) (2005); N.M.
STAT. § 40-13-2(C) (200S); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § S21(1) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B1(a) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01(2) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3113.3l(A)0) (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.10) (200S); OR. REV. STAT. §
107.705(1) (2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a) (200S); R.I. GEN. LAws § 1515-1(2) (2009); S.c. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20(a) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-1010) (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601(1) (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § Sl.OOl
(2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1(1) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1l010) (2007);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-22S (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.0100) (2009); W. VA.
CODE § 4S-27-202 (200S); WIS. STAT. § S13.12(am) (200S); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-21102(a)(iii) (200S).
115 ALA. CODE § 30-5-2; ALASKA STAT. § 1S.66.990(3); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133601; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 10410); D.C. CODE
§ 16-1001(5); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1; HAw. REV. STAT. § 5S6-1; IND. CODE § 31-9-242; IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.2; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2132(3); 19-A ME. REV. ST. ANN. §
4002(1); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-501; MINN. STAT. § 51SB.01(a); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-21-3(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102; NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-9030); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1(1); N.]. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19(a); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50Bl(a); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31(A)0); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6102(a); S.c.
CODE ANN. § 20-4-20(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 25-10-1(1); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1l010); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.0100); W. VA. CODE § 4S-27-202; WIS. STAT. §
S13.12(am).
116 CONN. GEN. ST. § 46b-3Sa; FLA. STAT. § 74l.2S(2); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.0100);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.01S; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § S21(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.101(2); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7l.004.
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Only One-Third of the States Remedy Coercive Control, False
Imprisonment, or Restraint on Liberty

Only sixteen states recognize coercive behavior, false imprisonment,
or interference with personal liberty as abuse.ll7 These states,
however, differ in whether they remedy coercive control if there is no
physical violence or a threat of phYSical violence. For instance, in
Nevada and Missouri, the laws require that coercion must result from
force or a threat of force to qualify as abusive coercion. 118 In Alabama,
117 ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(a)(l)(d) (recognizing criminal coercion); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, § 1041(1)(g) (recognizing false imprisonment and coercion, defined as
compelling or inducing person to engage in or abstain from conduct which victim has
legal right to abstain or engage in by instilling fear of physical injury, property
damage, criminal conduct, accusation of having committed crime, subjecting person
to hatred, contempt or ridicule, participating or not in legal claim or defense,
interfering with person's official duties as public servant, or intending to harm another
person materially regarding person's health, safety, business, calling, career, financial
condition, reputation, or personal relationships); Id. tit. 11, §§ 791-92 (2007); FLA.
STAT. § 741.28(2) (recognizing false imprisonment); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303(1)
(recognizing forced imprisonment); 750 ILL. CaMP. ST. 60/103(9) (recognizing
'''[i]nterference with personal liberty' means committing or threatening physical
abuse, harassment, intimidation or willful deprivation so as to compel another to
engage in conduct from which she or he has a right to abstain or to refrain from
conduct in which she or he has a right to engage"); IND. CODE § 34-6-2-34.5 (2008)
(coercion actionable when intended through beating, mutilating, torturing, or killing
of vertebrate anima\); 19-A ME. REV. ST. ANN. § 4002(l)(C), (D) (recognizing
"compelling a person by force, threat of force or intimidation to engage in conduct
from which the person has a right or privilege to abstain or to abstain from conduct in
which the person has a right to engage . . . knowingly restricting substantially the
movements of another person without that person's consent or other lawful
authority"); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 4-50l(b)(1)(v) (recognizing false
imprisonment); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.010(1)(C) (defining coercion as "compelling
another by force or threat of force to engage in conduct from which the latter has a
right to abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the person has a right to
engage"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102(l)(b)(ix) (recognizing unlawful restraint);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.018(1)(c), (0 (recognizing "[c]ompelling the other by force or
threat of force to perform an act from which he has the right to refrain or to refrain
from an act which he has the right to perform" and "false imprisonment"); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 173-B:l(I)(d) (recognizing interference with freedom); N.]. STAT. ANN. §
2C:25-19(a)(6) (recognizing false imprisonment); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
6102(a)(3) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (recognizing forced detention); W. VA.
CODE § 48-27-202(5) ("Holding, confining, detaining or abducting another person
against that person's will."); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-800.3(1) (2007)
(defining domestic violence as including coercion for legislative declaration purposes
but not including coercion as ground for relieO.
liB Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.01O(1)(C) (defining coercion as "compelling another by
force or threat of force to engage in conduct from which the latter has a right to
abstain or to abstain from conduct in which the person has a right to engage"); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 33.018(1)(c) ("Compelling the other by force or threat of force to
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the law permits a remedy only for criminal coercion. 119 The laws of
Indiana and New Hampshire permit coercive control to be actionable
without physical violence to the petitioner only when there is the
torturing, mutilating, or killing of animals - actions that convey a
strong message of control and inflict emotional distress. 12o Finally,
many states permit petitioners to obtain a protective order on the
grounds of restraint of physical liberty, false imprisonment, or
interference with freedom.l2l This demonstrates that some states do
recognize that coercive domestic violence should be remedied. Yet,
these states by and large do not remedy coercion that is linked to a
"credible threatened negative consequence" that is psychologically
harmful but not phYSically harmful such as removing children,
interfering with immigration applications, revealing private
information, or humiliation. 122
4.

Only One-Third of the States Remedy Psychological, Emotional,
or Economic Abuse

Only one state, Michigan, provides a civil law remedy for economic
abuse.123 Seventeen other jurisdictions (sixteen states and the District
of Columbia) provide a remedy for domestic violence that is
composed of psychological or emotional abuse other than fear of
physical injury; those states' remedies fall into a few different
categories. IH Some of the laws limit the nonphysical abuse that can be
perform an act from which he has the right to refrain or to refrain from an act which
he has the right to perform.").
119 ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(a)(1) (stating that abuse includes criminal coercion, which
is defined as threats to "confine, restrain, or to cause physical injury to the threatened
person or another, or to damage the property or reputation of the threatened person
or another with intent thereby to induce the threatened person or another against his
will to do an unlawful act or refrain from doing a lawful act." (quoting ALA. CODE
§ 13A-6-25(a) (200S»).
120 IND. CODE § 34-6-2-34.5 (200S); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 633:3-a (200S).
121 See supra note 11S.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 11S-22.
But see 750 ILL. CaMP. ST.
60/103(9).
123 MICH. CaMP. LAws § 600.2950(1) (2007).
124 ALASKA STAT. § IS.66.990(3) (2009) (including harassment, defined under
ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(2)-(4) (2009»; CAL. FAM. CODE § 6203(a) (West 200S)
(including harassment, which is defined in CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (West 200S»;
DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 1041(1)(d) (2007); D.C. CODE § 16-1001(5) (2008) (including
stalking, which is defined under D.C. CODE § 22-404(b) (2008»; FLA. STAT. § 741.28
(2009) (identifying stalking, which is defined under FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (2009»;
HAw. REV. STAT. § 586-1 (2008); 750 ILL. COMPo STAT. 60/103(7) (2009); IND. CODE §
31-9-2-42( 4) (2008) (including harassment, defined under IND. CODE § 35-45-2-2

2009]

Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies

1135

remedied to acts governed by criminal law.125 Under three of the
statutes, repeated acts, identified under the law as a "course of
conduct," are not required. 126 In those states, conduct that objectively

(2008)); MICH. COMPo LAws § 600:2950(1) (2008) (including prohibiting impairment
of petitioner's employment and education and stalking, which is defined under MICH.
CaMP. LAws § 750.411h (2008)); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.01O(1)(d) (2009); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 33.0180)(e) (2009) (course of conduct intended to harass); N.]. STAT. ANN. §
2C:33-4 (2005); N.M. STAT. § 40-13-2(C)(2) (2008); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 8210)
(2008) (including harassment, defined under N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25 (McKinney
2008)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(a) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3(c) (2009);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.211(A)(l) (West 2007); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-15-1(8)
(2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5131(6) (2007). Interestingly, Oklahoma makes
stalking and harassment actionable grounds for a CPO but explicitly carves them out
from its definition of domestic violence. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 60.1 (2008). Under the
Oklahoma statute, stalking requires fear of death or great bodily injury. Id. But
harassment does not require physical violence. If there is a "knowing and willful
course or pattern of conduct" that "seriously alarms or annoys the [targeted] person,
and which serves no legitimate purpose" then the act constitutes actionable
harassment if the targeted person both objectively and subjectively suffers "substantial
emotional distress." Id.
One state, Colorado, officially recognizes that domestic violence manifests in
various types of control but fails to provide a remedy for nonviolent abuse. The
Colorado General Assembly as recently as 2007 amended its CPO statute to include a
legislative declaration that "Domestic violence is not limited to physical threats of
violence and harm but includes financial control, document control, property control
and other types of control that make a victim more likely to return to an abuser due to
fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic needs." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-102
1(b)(I) (2008). Unfortunately, the legislature did not amend the "domestic abuse"
definition of its CPO statute to make actionable these forms of domestic violence. Id. §
13-14-101(2) (2008). Rather, the Colorado law limits "domestic abuse" to "any act or
threatened act of violence." Id.
125 For instance, under the CPO statute in the District of Columbia, domestic
violence is any act punishable as a criminal offense. D.C. CODE § 16-1001(5). Such
criminal offenses include stalking, which is engaging on more than one occasion "in
conduct with the intent to cause emotional distress to another person . . . by . . .
harassing that person." Id. § 22-404(b). And harassing is defined as "engaging in a
course of conduct either in person, by telephone, or in writing, directed at a specific
person, which seriously alarms, annoys, frightens, or torments the person or ... would
cause a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed, frightened or tormented."
Id. § 22-404(e); see Richardson v. Easterling, 878 A.2d 1212, 1217 (D.C. 2005) (defining
actionable stalking as domestic violence for CPO purposes). Similarly, Maine includes a
stalking-like ground for a CPO but does not require fear of serious bodily injury or
emotional harm. 19-A ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4002(l)(F) (2008).
126 See, e.g., 750 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 60/103(7)0) (creating disturbance at petitioner's
employment or school is enough to constitute harassment); see Shields v. Fry, 703
N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (upholding CPO grounds of harassment because
respondent's acts caused petitioner emotional distress by making her uncomfortable,
upset, and angry); see also ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990(3)(H) (including harassment,
defined under ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.120(a)(2)-(4) (2008)); IND. CODE § 31-9-2-42(4)
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and subjectively causes emotional distress is actionable under the civil
laws remedying domestic violence.127 The rest of the states that
remedy nonphysical domestic violence require a course of conduct,
but make different types of conduct actionable. For instance, eight
states remedy domestic violence that actually results in emotional
distress. us Three states require that the domestic violence both
subjectively and objectively result in emotional harm.u9 The District

(including harassment, defined under IND. CODE § 35-45-2-2 (2008».
127 750 ILL. COMPo ST. 60/103(7) (stating that "knowing conduct which is not
necessary to accomplish a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances; would
cause a reasonable person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress to the
petitioner" constitutes form of domestic violence worthy of CPO); see Shields, 703
N.E.2d at 922-23.
128 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. § 40-13-2(C)(2) (2008) (stating that domestic violence
includes acts causing "severe emotional distress"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(a) (2009)
("[C]ontinued harassment . . . that rises to such a level as to inflict substantial
emotional distress" constitutes domestic violence). Further, under the North Carolina
law, harassment is conduct "directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or
terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate purpose." Id. § 14-277.3(c) (2009);
see Wornstaff V. Wornstaff, 634 S.E.2d 567, 569-70 (N.C. 2006) (upholding CPO on
basis of harassment, including banging of stapler, throwing water bottle, and refusal to
leave, which caused substantial emotional distress). Causing mental distress is
sometimes included in the scope of domestic violence. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2903.211(A)(1) (stating that "pattern of conduct [that] knowingly causers] . . .
mental distress" meets definition of domestic violence as well); see Dunkin V. Ireland,
No. 04AP-1175, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 3110, at *14-15, *17 (Ct. App. June 30,2005)
(upholding CPO on grounds of stalking when appellant threatened appellee she
would lose kids, took photos of her house, and sorted through her trash, because he
had engaged in pattern of conduct that caused appellee mental distress); see also CAL.
FAM. CODE § 6203(a) (including harassment, which is defined in CAL. PENAL CODE §
646.9(e) (West 2008»; FLA. STAT. § 741.28 (identifying stalking, which is defined
under FLA. STAT. § 784.048 (2008»; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 821(1) (including
harassment, defined under N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.25 (McKinney 2008». In Rhode
Island, cyberstalking that results in emotional distress is grounds for a CPO as it is
domestic violence. R.I. GEN. LAwS § 15-15-1(7). Under Rhode Island law,
'''cyberstalking' means transmitting any communication by computer to any person or
causing any person to be contacted for the sole purpose of harassing that person or his
or her family." Id. And in Vermont, stalking that results in substantial emotional
distress constitutes domestic violence for CPO purposes. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
5131(6) (stating domestic violence includes stalking, which is course of conduct of
"following or lying in wait for a person, or threatening behavior directed at a specific
person ... [and] would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or
would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress").
129 Hawaii makes actionable "extreme psychological abuse" as a form of domestic
violence, and defines it as a course of conduct that both subjectively and objectively
results in emotional distress. HAw. REV. ST. § 586-1. The statute defines "extreme
psychological abuse" as "an intentional or knowing course of conduct directed at an
individual that seriously alarms or disturbs consistently or continually bothers the
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of Columbia permits the course of conduct to result in either
subjective or objective emotional harm. 130 New Jersey provides a
remedy for domestic violence that either causes or is intended to cause
emotional distress. 131 And Delaware remedies conduct that is likely to
lead to emotional harm, regardless of whether the conduct actually
results in such harm.132 Therefore, while sixteen states and D.C.
provide a cause of action for emotional and psychological harm, there
is little consistency as to what is actually required to obtain a remedy.
Moreover, the statutes' definitions of emotional and psychological

individual, and that serves no legitimate purpose; provided that such course of
conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer extreme emotional distress." ld.;
see Kie v. McMahel, 984 P.2d 1264, 1266-67 (Haw. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding CPO,
with minimal analysis, on basis of extreme psychological abuse). Michigan and
Missouri also remedy a course of conduct that results in subjective and objective
emotional distress. MICH. COMPo LAws § 750.41lh(l)(c) (2007) (defining domestic
violence to include "conduct directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited
to, repeated or continuing un consented contact that would cause a reasonable
individual to suffer emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer
emotional distress"). In addition, under the Michigan civil domestic violence law,
'''[elmotional distress' means significant mental suffering or distress that may, but
does not necessarily, require medical or other professional treatment or counseling."
ld. § 750.41lh(l)(b); Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.010(1)(d) (stating that domestic violence
includes "engaging in a purposeful or knowing course of conduct involving more than
one incident that alarms or causes distress to another ... and serves no legitimate
purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable adult to
suffer substantial emotional distress and must actually cause substantial emotional
distress to the petitioner"); see Beckers V. Seck, 14 S.W.3d 139, 145 (Mo. 2000)
(upholding renewal of CPO based on respondent's actions that led to plaintifPs
substantial emotional distress).
130 In the District of Columbia, the CPO law permits a CPO to be granted when
there is a course of conduct that results in either subjective or objective emotional
harm if it meets the criminal definition of stalking. D.C. CODE §§ 16-1001(5), 22404(b), (e).
13l N.]. STAT. ANN. § 2C:33-4 (2006) (stating actionable domestic violence includes
communication or alarming course of conduct causing or with purpose of causing
annoyance or alarm, or subjects other to offensive touching); see, e.g., D.V. V. A.H.,
926 A.2d 887, 890 (N.j. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2007) (granting CPO for harassment
caused by offensively coarse language in phone calls at inconvenient times causing
petitioner alarm); Tribuzio V. Roder, 813 A.2d 1210, 1215 (N.]. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2003) (upholding CPO on grounds of harassment and stalking for defendant's
repeated approaching of plaintiff, yelling at her, insistence on communication, and
blocking in her car).
132 Delaware's CPO remedies a course of "alarming or distressing conduct . . .
which is likely to cause fear or emotional distress" but does not require actual
emotional distress. DEL CODE tit. 10, § 1041(l)(d) (2005); see M.B. V. H.B., CS0204668, 2003 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 15, at *5-6 (Fam. Ct. May 2, 2003) (discussing this
statutory provision).
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harm are not explicitly linked to the previously cited domestic
violence theories of coercive control and oppression.
5.

Summary of the CPO Remedy

All states recognize crimes such as assault and acts resulting in bodily
harm as domestic violence and provide a corresponding remedy. Most
state laws recognize threats of bodily harm as domestic violence as well.
But only one-third of the states recognize emotional, psychological, or
economic abuse without a threat of physical violence as domestic
violence worthy of a civil law remedy. 133 Indeed, Connecticut's civil law
explicitly requires physical violence and threat of physical violence for
actionable domestic violence, stating that "[v 1erbal abuse or argument
shall not constitute family violence unless there is present danger and
the likelihood that physical violence will oCCUr."134
II.

How A LIMITED DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HARMS
WOMEN

There are three broad categories of negative consequences that
result from the failure of the civil laws to remedy all fundamental
harms of domestic violence. The first is the most obvious. With a
limited view of domestic violence, anyone who has been subjected to
various forms of domestic violence not covered under the CPO
statutory definition of domestic violence cannot file a cause of action
or obtain a remedy. Women suffer great harm from psychological,
emotional, and economic abuse.
These harms include severe
emotional distress, phYSical harm, isolation, sustained fear,
intimidation, poverty, degradation, humiliation, and coerced loss of
autonomy.135 And CPOs have successfully decreased abuse and
attacked power imbalances. 136 Therefore, a CPO could potentially
remediate the harms of emotional, psychological, and economic abuse.
Moreover, given the research that psychological and emotional abuse
can lead to physical abuse, providing a CPO remedy before this

133 Indeed, under Connecticut's civil law, it explicitly requires phYSical violence
and threat of physical abuse for actionable domestic violence when it states that
"[ v 1erbal abuse or argument shall not constitute family violence unless there is
present danger and the likelihood that physical violence will occur." CONN. GEN ST.
§ 46b-38a(l) (2008).
134 Id.
135 Adams, supra note 36, at 563-68.
136 See supra Part 1. C.
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happens may also prevent physical abuse.137 The second broad
category of the consequences of the law's failure to remedy domestic
violence is the loss of the woman's agency in decisionmaking about
how best to address the abuse in her relationship. Because increased
autonomy is linked with a decrease in abuse, loss of agency is
detrimental to women. 138 The third category is the limit on women's
ability to obtain other remedies because certain civil laws are linked to
actionable domestic violence under CPO laws.
Each of these
consequences are discussed below.
A.

Some Women Subjected to Domestic Violence Have No CPO Remedy

Due to the states' failure to remedy all forms of domestic violence,
Vanessa and Kim are not able to bring a claim or obtain a remedy in
two-thirds of all states. And while Susan would have an action in all
jurisdictions for the physical abuse to which VIner subjected her, she
would not be eligible for a remedy in most states for the other acts
VIner committed, including the act that caused her the most pain VIner's demand that their son videotape VIner's degradation and
humiliation of her. If Susan does not have a cause of action for certain
forms of abuse, she might be unable to remedy them. For instance, she
may want VIner to turn over all copies of the videotape, but if the
taping is not seen as part of the domestic violence, this relief might be
denied. Many states have included in their legislative histories the goal
of attacking the type of oppressive power and control demonstrated by
VIner even without physical abuse.139 But amending the CPO statutes
to reflect this goal is the only way women can be ensured a forum to air
their abuse and to seek a remedy for it. Research shows that the mere
act of petitioning for a CPO can decrease subsequent violence. 140
Accordingly, if CPO laws were to recognize all of the fundamental
harms of domestic violence, more women could file petitions and
perhaps experience a decrease in abuse.

See supra Part I. C.
See supra Part I. C.
139 See, e.g., Murphy v. Okeke, 951 A.2d 783, 790 (D.C. 2008) (stating CPO statute
was intended to "counteract the abuse and exploitation of women").
140 McFarlane, supra note 95, at 616.
137

138
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Women Are Often Deprived of Autonomy in the Decisionmaking
Regarding a CPO Remedy

As identified above, all legislatures have enacted CPO laws that focus
on physical violence and most have enacted CPO laws that primarily
redress domestic violence that is an explicit criminal act. 141 An early
reason for linking the civil domestic violence definition to crimes, in
part, was that activists for battered women saw the CPO laws as a
response to the failings of the criminal justice system to protect women
subjected to abuse. l42 Some legal commentators have classified the CPO
as a hybrid between civil and criminal laws, which further blurs the line
between the two systems. 143 Many system actors, such as judges, clerks,
and lawyers, therefore, believe that all domestic violence should be
interchangeable with their understanding of criminal acts. l44 As a
result, even petitioners can become confused about the differences
between the civil legal system and the criminal justice system. 145 Yet the
civil system is available to private parties with a dispute while the
criminal system is reserved for the state to enforce the criminal laws.
When the line is blurred between these two systems, women subjected
to abuse can suffer numerous negative consequences within the civil
legal system. As a result, when domestic violence law remedies only
See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
Balos, supra note 23, at 564.
143 In part, this characterization results from the fact that CPO violations can be
criminally enforced through criminal contempt or prosecution of a misdemeanor crime.
See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt §§ 147-48 (2008) (stating criminal contempt is available for
many violations of civil court orders); Waul, supra note 100, at 54; see also Goldfarb,
supra note 22, at 1509 (citing Waul, supra note 100, at 53 (calling CPO "criminal justice
system interventions"»; Klein &: Orloff, supra note 79, at 1102-20,1142-48.
144 See FINN &: COLSON, supra note 11, at 10 (stating that domestic violence is crime
that needs CPOs because criminal justice system is not always best system in which to
address domestic violence).
145 Many petitioners seek a CPO because when the police responded to their 911 call,
the police told them to go to court and file a "CPO." See, e.g., Metropolitan Police
Report, The Police Can Help in Domestic Violence Situations, http://mpdc.dc.gov/
mpddcwp/view,a,l232,q,541117.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2009) (stating police
responding to 911 call can make referrals to CPO proceedings). Accordingly, because a
criminal justice system actor is telling them to file for an order, petitioners often think
that the CPO process is related to the criminal justice system. Unified intake centers,
where petitioners meet with prosecutors and civil advocates and attorneys in the same
physical location, and unified courts that handle both criminal and civil domestic
violence cases in the same unit may heighten this confusion. See generally Thomas F.
Capshew &: c. Aaron McNeece, Empirical Studies oj Civil Protection Orders in Intimate
Violence: A Review oj the Literature, 6 CRISIS INTERVENTION AND TIME-LIMITED TREATMENT
151,163 (2000) (stating that women who participated in civil legal system found it to be
intertwined with criminal justice system).
141

142
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physical violence, women suffer additional negative consequences.
These consequences are discussed below.
1.

Psychological, Emotional, and Economic Abuse Are Not
Addressed or Redressed

When the civil system is deeply intertwined with the criminal
justice system, it tends to restrict the domestic violence narrative to
criminal acts and physical violence. Psychological, emotional, and
economic abuses are not addressed nor listened to unless they
somehow meet the definition of a crime that is recognized by the
Accordingly, society tells women like Kim 147 that
court. 146
nonphysical violence is unworthy of a response or remedy. Many
legal theorists have written about the importance of "giving a name" to
domestic violence. 148 One commentator states, "[ t] he development of
legal process can shape social consciousness by identifying and
redefining harm, breaking down the public-private dichotomy, and
legitimizing the seriousness of the problem."149 Feminists Similarly
believe that individual experience influenced and was influenced by
the collective. 150 That is to say that the individual woman's ability to
name the domestic violence impacts society's broader understanding
of the systemic nature and influence of the power and oppression that
is domestic violence. 151 Therefore, while it is important to label
domestic violence as criminal and physical violence, it is equally
important that domestic violence also include the labels of emotional,
psychological, and economic abuse as manifestations of the
oppression. IS2 As one study shows, the
CPO process was a means for creating a public record of the
abuse [women] had experienced. It was a way for them to
break their silence and send a message to the batterer that his
behavior would not be tolerated.
Several women also

Burke, supra note 26, at 570.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
148 SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 46; Miccio, supra note 80, at 288.
149 SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 46.
150 Miccio, supra note 80, at 30l.
151 ld.
152 ld. at 288 ("Adrienne Rich understood the power of naming.
She recognized
that empowerment of a people is derived, in part, through the act of naming naming the source of oppression and the site of pain. The power of naming gives
voice to social phenomenon, while making visible the invisible. And it constructs
how we interpret certain experiences.").
146

147
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indicated that filing a protective order allowed them to take
some initial steps toward regaining control of their lives. 153
Accordingly, the naming and narrative of domestic violence is unjustly
constrained when co-opted as criminal law or physical violence alone.
This constraint ignores many of the harms to women subjected to abuse.
2.

The Quasi-Criminal Nature of the CPO Undermines Women's
Own Goals

Negative consequences also result from the fact that the criminal
justice system has different goals than the civil system. In the criminal
justice system, states, not private parties, are the actors entitled to a
remedy. That remedy is driven by the states' view of justice. When
the civil legal system is seen as quasi-criminal, however, there is a risk
that outside actors' views (such as those of the courts and petitioners'
attorneys) regarding the relevant harm and remedy will control, rather
than the CPO petitioners' view of the relevant harm and remedy. The
criminal justice system is focused primarily on the protection from
and eradication of severe physical violence for the benefit of society,
while the civil system's goal is to provide the petitioner with a remedy
that addresses her harms from domestic violence. 154 As a result, when
judges, clerks, advocates, or lawyers blur the lines between the civil
and criminal justice systems, they often fail to permit the petitioner to
include her entire experience of the violence as it exists within her
relationship. 155

Fischer &. Rose, supra note 102, at 414.
Shazia Choudhry, Righting Domestic Violence, 20 INT'L]. L. POL'y &. FAM. 95, 96
(2006) (discussing state's interest and its interventionist strategy as opposed to
woman's privacy interest).
155 It should be noted that certain jurisdictions do permit the court to inquire into
the entire "mosaic" of the violence in CPO proceedings. See Cruz-Foster v. Foster,
597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C. 1991). However, even in those jurisdictions, the ability to
explore the mosaic does not actually permit the addressing of the fundamental harms
of psychological, emotional, and economic abuse. This is because courts do not
explore the mosaic unless the petitioner states an actionable claim of domestic
violence based on the statute's definition. Id. Therefore, for women who suffer
nonphysical violence, courts cannot address their abuse if the statutes only permit
physical abuse to be addressed. In addition, the exploration of the mosaic is intended
to permit past acts of actionable violence to be included to help corroborate the
current act of violence. See id. (arguing mosaic of past violent conduct should be
explored to help predict future conduct). There is no remedy offered for the violence
included in the mosaic, and what is permissible as mosaic information is also shaped
by the statute's definition of domestic violence. Finally, for women like Kim
(discussed at the beginning of this Article) who do not know that they can seek a
153
154
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Instead, system actors often limit testimony to their own view of the
most worthy criminal act. Courts often view crimes through a
hierarchical lens. For that reason, courts sometimes convey that a
CPO should be sought only for a "worthy" incident of physical
violence, one where the court can feel it is actually saving a life, such
as an assault or battery. Courts often place crimes such as stalking
and harassment, which are crimes that sometimes address
psychological abuse, at the bottom of their hierarchical ranking. As a
result, courts are less inclined to grant a CPO based on these crimes
because courts do not perceive them as worthy enough. For example,
one judge denied a CPO for cyberstalking, despite the fact that the
CPO law included cyberstalking in the definition of domestic violence.
In denying the CPO, the trial judge stated:
In this domestic violence area, there are many crimes. At the

top of the line is assault. Then there is threat of serious bodily
injury. There is stalking, which is above harassment. Stalking
is a course of repeated conduct that places the plaintiff in
reasonable fear of bodily injury to plaintiff or a third person.
Here, the course of conduct includes repeated calls that
involve vulgarity or intent to upset another person, in addition
to a threat to injure plaintiff and plaintiffs car.
There is
evidence of an extensive course of such conduct, but no one
got hurt. Twelve years ago [before enactment of the stalking
criminal law],156 the court could not intervene in people's
lives, where they go and how they contact others. Courts
should be reluctant to do so unless the plaintiff can meet the
burden of proof. I wish you had worked this out by
yourselves. The court is powerless to do anything meaningful
except to make this worse. A protection order wouldn't
protect anyone. The only protection would be against insults.
My responsibility is to protect lives. Therefore, I am denying
plaintiffs protection order. 157

remedy for the harms to which they are subjected, there is a great benefit and power
when they can name domestic violence under the statutes, making it clear that their
abuse is illegal and they are entitled to a remedy. See supra note 2 and accompanying
text (stating Kim did not know domestic violence could include nonphysical abuse).
156 Note that Maryland only recently added stalking as an actionable form of abuse
under the CPO law, on October 1, 2005. See Effect of Amendments, MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAw § 4-501 (West 2007).
157 This is a slightly modified version of a Maryland court ruling in a 2007
domestic violence CPO case, altered slightly to focus on the most relevant issues to
this Article. It is an approximation rather than a transcription because it is based on
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As seen above, despite the statute, the court saw the CPO as only
necessary to save lives. Because the alleged acts of domestic violence,
cyberstalking, were not life-threatening, the court refused to grant the
cPO. Such a limited view of a CPO's goals hurts women by excluding
those who suffer abuse that is not life threatening but is still extremely
harmful and in need of a legal remedy.
3.

Desensitization to Other Forms of Domestic Violence

When CPO statutes rely on criminal law and severe physical
violence to define what is actionable domestic violence, judges and
other system actors, such as clerks, attorneys and advocates, may
become desensitized to all forms of domestic violence except those
involving extreme criminal battery. 158
Therefore, the narrative
becomes more restricted. The discourse of domestic violence excludes
even that domestic violence that is actionable under the CPO laws but
does not involve severe physical violence.
For example, there is a range of intentional, offensive touching that
can meet the criminal act of assault. Yet despite a CPO law's inclusion
of any assault as domestic violence, many courts will discount acts
that do not result in severe physical injury or that they do not see as
seriously violent. In a troubling illustration of this, a husband hit his
wife with an electrical cord on numerous occasions and locked her in
a closet for several hours. When the wife requested a police escort at
the end of her CPO hearing to retrieve her personal belongings from
their joint residence, the judge refused and stated: "This is pretty
trivial .... This court has a lot more serious matters to contend with.
We're doing a terrible disservice to the taxpayers here. You want to
gnaw on her and she on you, fine, but let's not do it at the taxpayet's
expense." 159
The courts' desensitization to domestic violence is also seen in those
jurisdictions where the CPO laws encompass threats of violence and
nonviolent crimes, such as harassment and stalking. For instance,
even when the CPO statute permits threats as actionable domestic
violence,
Some judges are reluctant to exercise their authority to issue
an order when threats are alleged but no actual battery has

my notes rather than the hearing transcript. See notes on file with author.
158 See Wan, supra note 87, at 623.
159 Bue!, supra note 90, at 968 (citing Joan Meier, Batteredjustice, WASH. MONTHLY,
May 1987, at 38).
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occurred. For example a judge in a state that authorizes
protective orders on the basis of threats grants orders only if
there have been several threats and the abuser has the ability
to carry ou t his menaces. 160
Therefore, judges are not exercising their full statutory authority in
addressing as broad a spectrum of domestic violence as is permitted
under their existing CPO laws. Rather, courts and others tend to
credit only extreme criminal physical violence and discount
comparatively minor physical abuse or other domestic violence.
4.

Women's Stories of Abuse Are Limited

When courts limit actionable domestic violence to decontextualized
criminal events of severe physical abuse, courts and other system
actors alter or silence women's stories of domestic violence told in
public court proceedings. When judges minimize or justify such
forms of abuse, women are even more reluctant to use the civil legal
system to address their needs. 161 Women's ability to have a public
forum to air the abuse to which they have been subjected can offer
healing, validation, and empowerment. 162 When advocates, lawyers,
and courts limit women's ability to have this necessary and
appropriate public forum to address serious harms, they negatively
affect women subjected to abuse. One study shows that the failure of
courts to grant CPOs to qualified women subjected to abuse harms
them further because they are subsequently subjected to more abuse
and threats of abuse than women who were qualified for CPOs and
received them. 163 To avoid this harm, the law and the courts need to
permit women to seek CPOs for all forms of abuse. This will empower
women subjected to abuse to address their abuse effectively. 1M
160 FINN &: COLSON, supra note 11, at 1l. The authors do not know why the judges
fail to do so but posit that perhaps they are uncertain about whether the threats met
the additional requirements of the stalking statute. ld. at 10-11. Although unclear,
this tends to indicate that any CPO law amendments need to be specific about the
criteria so that judges do not add extra elements unintended by the statute.
161 See Buel, supra note 90, at 968.
162 See, e.g., id. at 996-97 (noting that when prevented from telling their stories,
women subjected to abuse are precluded from opportunity for healing and witnessing
offenders be held accountable); Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives, supra note
101, at 756-57 (sharing narratives of women who are abused offers validation and
increases system actors' empathetic understanding).
163 Gist, supra note 95, at 67-68.
164 Buel, supra note 90, at 1020 (arguing for new tort of domestic violence to offer
credibility and empowerment to victims of domestic violence).
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It is important to note that it is not only courts that preclude women
who are abused from seeking a remedy, even though they are
otherwise qualified under the CPO statute. Silencing by other actors
was documented by a commentator who observed the domestic
violence intake center in the District of Columbia. She found that
when resources were limited, petitioner's attorneys decided that "only
the most severe cases are assigned an attorney."165 Therefore, qualified
petitioners only received the assistance of an attorney if they were
subjected to severe physical abuse, thus perpetuating the
misperception of domestic violence.
Linda Mills asserts that
"mainstream feminists exert power by defining who women in abusive
relationships are and therefore what they should do about the violence
in their lives."166 It is important that feminists, along with other
advocates, lawyers, and courts, critically analyze the stories of
domestic violence that we have constructed and examine why they
focus on physical violence and exclude the other fundamental harms
of domestic violence.
It is common, of course, to equate domestic violence with physical
violence. When women are killed, newspapers publicize the stories of
courts failing to help these women. The more gruesome the violence,
the more prominent the story. These stories should be front-page
news and should be greeted with public outrage and sadness. Yet
other women's stories also need to be heard. By excluding the
fundamental harms of psychological, emotional, and economic abuse
and focusing on physical abuse, we exclude many women who want to
seek legal redress but cannot, or do seek legal redress but are denied.
For instance, twenty-year-old Anna Bergman sought a CPO in
Catonsville, Maryland, on Friday, July 27, 2007.167 When Bergman
went to court seeking a protective order, she was concerned because
Ryan Butler, her ex-partner and the father of her children, had
threatened to harm her new boyfriend. 168 A court commissioner
explained later that Bergman was unsuccessful in seeking a protective
165 Waul, supra note 100, at 64 (emphasis added). Of course, such a decision is
even more problematic in its determination of who is worthy of a valuable resource.
Given the fact that the legal system expects to grant CPOs to women who are
subjected to severe physical abuse, women subjected to abuse that does not fit the
court's assumptions about "real" abuse might actually have a greater need for an
attorney to be successful in their claim.
166 MILLS, supra note 74, at 50.
167 Suzanne Collins, Family:
Murdered Mom Was Denied Protective Order, \¥]Z
(Catonsville, Md.), Aug. 1, 2007, available at hup:llwjz.comltopstories/
Anna.Bergman.murder.2.429044.html.
168 Id.
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order because she only described a threat against her boyfriend but
said nothing about threats against herself. 169 Bergman most likely
perceived the threat against her boyfriend as a threat against herself.
Nonetheless, she left the courthouse without any court-ordered
relief.170 Three days later, Bergman was murdered by Butler, who also
abducted their three-year-old son. l7l This brutal murder made the ,
news, which is how everyone learned about what Ms. Bergman had
experienced in the court three days earlier.
After Bergman's horrific murder, the press blamed clerks' offices and
judges for their failure to encourage victims of domestic violence to fill
out detailed forms asking about the history of abuse, including
stalking and harassment. 172 Experts justifiably criticized clerks,
commissioners, and judges for not asking enough questions to learn
about the prior physical abuse between Bergman and Butler. 173 Critics
asked why the system failed to explore the entire context of Ms.
Bergman's relationship with Mr. Butler. The answer may be that the
questions were not asked because society has limited the scope of
domestic violence in the legal system so that few ever ask these
questions or try to learn the full story. In fact, when legally relevant
information is included, clerks or judges often state that only the most
important and egregious crimes should warrant a CPO remedy. A
judge in Wisconsin expressed his disdain for actionable but
nonphysical domestic violence by stating,
These cases aren't anything compared to how it used to be.
I've been here in family court for over 30 years and I never
used to see this kind of crap ... women used to come in with
real abuse cases ... broken arms and bloody noses. 174
Because so many judges and courts have decided that severe physical
violence is the most important, often the only actionable goal in court
is saving lives. Any other goal, such as the broader goal of trying to
rearrange one's relationship with the abuser to remediate the

Id.
Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. (citing Dorothy Lennig, Legal Dir., House of Ruth, who stated, '''Clearly she
was afraid of something and as it turns out she had a real reason to be afraid. Had the
commissioner listened to her testify and read her petition, it may have shown a
different story"').
173 Id.
174 Wan, supra note 87, at 623.
169
170
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multifaceted abuse and harms thereto, is more often than not
precluded from being aired and litigated.
For example, Ms. Bergman unsuccessfully sought a remedy for the
threat against her boyfriend. Ms. Bergman's goal, which the court
understood as protecting her boyfriend from a threat without any prior
physical harm toward him, was inconsistent with the court's goal of
saving her from physical harm. Yet, Ms. Bergman's testimony, in fact,
was enough to state a claim under the Maryland statute because the
threat was really aimed at her. Her testimony was sufficient to begin a
conversation with the court about domestic violence. Broadly defined,
domestic violence included her ex-husband's exercise of power and
control that led to various forms of physical, emotional, psychological,
and economic abuse. No court will pursue these important inquiries,
however, until judges start looking beyond incidents of crimes and
severe physical violence and "saving" women's lives.
In Ms. Bergman's case, the court should have responded to her claim
with inquiries of how her ex-husband was exerting power and control
over her and how she wished to reorganize her relationship with him
to address the oppressive control. The court could then have explored
whether and how her ex-husband attempted to control and intimidate
Ms. Bergman in a patterned and oppressive way, such as the presence
of phYSical violence, other threats of physical violence, any economic
coercion, and any and all patterns of derogatory behavior, isolation,
humiliation, or other psychological or emotional abuse. This would
have allowed Ms. Bergman to share her experience of abuse and would
have contextualized the threat against Ms. Bergman's boyfriend.
Research shows that such an approach by the court improves the
woman's satisfaction with the legal process and permits the woman to
exert her autonomy, thus best redressing the violence in her life. 175
5.

State Becomes De Facto Decisionmaker, Which Undermines
Women's Agency

In the criminal justice system, the state, through the prosecutor and
the court, is the decisionmaker as to how the criminal case will proceed
by determining what charges to bring, what plea to accept, and what to
175 See id. at 615-31 (describing Wan's various typologies based on similar ones
created by James Ptacek); see also James Ptacek, Disorder in the Courts: Judicial
Demeanor and Women's Experience Seeking Restraining Orders (1995) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University) (on file with author). In Wan's typology,
"good-natured" system actors who understood their role as permitting the autonomy
of the petitioner provided women better experience and greater autonomy. Wan,
supra note 87, at 615.
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try.176 Because courts often view CPOs as quasi-criminal, judges may
take a "more interventionist, rather than deferential, approach."177 For
instance, judges presiding over CPO hearings much more frequently
intervene and deny petitioners' motions to vacate than judges who
decide plaintiffs' motions to dismiss in other civil litigation. 17S As a
result, CPO judges often "are substituting their judgment for that of the
victims who are seeking assistance in their courtrooms."179 The judges
end up controlling the woman through their official power. In effect,
the legal system allows the state and other outside actors to be the
decisionmakers to save the woman because the system actors believe
she is ill-suited to address the abuse. ISO However, since the petitioner
brings a civil CPO case, it should be governed by her judgments and
goals, not those of the judges.
By depriving a woman subjected to abuse of her decisionmaking
role, the civil legal system undermines her ability to self-direct and
define how best to address the abuse in her relationship. lSI Hence, the
legal system inhibits her agency.182 Many women subjected to abuse
are skeptical of resolution through the criminal justice system because
mandatory arrest lS3 and no-drop prosecutionlS4 policies have resulted
in a system that overrides victims' interest for society's interest. lss
176 Miccio, supra note 80, at 266 (discussing marginalization of women subjected
to abuse in criminal justice system and specifically in no-drop prosecution
jurisdictions) .
177 Kuennen, supra note 15, at 44-46' (discussing failure of judges to treat CPO
cases as they treat other civil injunction cases).
17S Kohn, supra note 64, at 234.
179 LISA A. GOODMAN &: DEBORAH EpSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN:
A
SURVIVOR-CENTERED ApPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 81 (2008).
ISO Id. at 82-83.
lSI MILLS, supra note 74, at 31 (" [Tlhe idea that intimate violence is best addressed
by silencing the victim and letting the state take the initiative against the batterer,
ignores the significance of a woman's agency when she is threatened by intimate
violence."); Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1510,1514-15.
IS2 See Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1499; Kohn, supra note 64, at 244-45 (stating
research shows that women subjected to abuse are in best position to predict future
violence and that criminal justice systems that exclude such women from
decisionmaking fail to enhance their safety).
IS3 Miccio, supra note 80, at 265, 278-79 (noting by 1994 most states incorporated
mandatory arrest policies, requiring police to arrest someone in response to any 911
domestic-violence-related call).
IS4 Id. at 265-66 (discussing no-drop prosecution policies that require prosecutors
to pursue prosecution of domestic violence related crimes even if victim fails to
cooperate in prosecution).
IS5 Kohn, supra note 64, at 202-03 n.53.
For other reasons why women are
skeptical of the criminal justice system, see Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal Is
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Because most CPO laws rely on criminal statutes to define domestic
violence, many women believe that the CPO system will treat them in
the same manner as the criminal justice system. As a result, these
women often believe that once they file a civil case, they will lose
control over the outcome as they would in a criminal matter. 186 Sadly,
that belief is supportable. In addition to the courts' refusal to grant
women's motions to dismiss, a 1990 U.S. Department of Justice report
on CPOs underscores the common view that CPOs are for judges' use,
not women's, to address domestic violence. The report states, "Civil
protection orders ... offer judges a unique additional tool for
responding to the special difficulties of domestic violence cases." 187
Women lose their control as a party to the litigation when the judge
and other system actors view the case as one controlled solely by the
legal system. If, for instance, the woman's goal for the CPO is to
continue her relationship with the abuser with an injunction against
future abuse but the judge's goal is to separate the woman from her
abuser, the judge may be contemptuous of the woman and of the
judge's role in sanctioning her decisionmaking. One Wisconsin judge
stated deriSively, "My job is to hand out [CPOs] to women and then
watch couples kiss and make Up."188 That comment reveals a belief
that women should not be able to make decisions because they are not
making the right decisions, despite the research on separation
assault. 189 Alternatively, when women subjected to abuse make their
own decisions regarding how to address the abuse in their life, it
provides greater empowerment and prevention against future domestic
violence. 190
Political- and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 40l.
The study is consistent with the experience of a client of one of my clinic students.
The client had been subjected to abuse, and wanted to hold her husband accountable,
but did not want to involve the police in such a way as to trigger mandatory arrest and
no-drop prosecution. Therefore, rather than calling the 911 number for emergencies,
she called 311, which was the nonemergency police telephone number in the District
of Columbia. See notes from clinic supervision session on file with author.
186 Waul, supra note 100, at 53.
187 FINN & COLSON, supra note 11, at 1 (emphaSiS added). But see Kuennen, supra
note 15, at 67 (citing New Jersey court decision in which court acknowledged that
criminal and civil legal systems are different and that, therefore, petitioners should
have "'complete autonomy of decisionmaking'" in civil cases) (internal citation
omitted).
188 Wan, supra note 87, at 623.
189 WALKER, supra note 29, at 55-56.
190 See supra Part I.B; see also Deborah Epstein, Margaret E. Bell & Lisa A.
Goodman, Transforming Aggressive Prosecution Policies: Prioritizing Victims' LongTerm Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases, 11 AM. U. ]. GENDER, Soc.

2009]

Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies

1151

When courts override women's decisions in a civil proceeding as to
how to address the abuse in their relationship, the result is
problematic. "[A]n important element of responding to the problem
[of domestic violence] is to restore a victim's fundamental rights of
freedom, choice and autonomy."191 Expanding options for women
subjected to abuse, including civil legal options that such women can
control, can promote women's agency. By expanding the recognition
of all harmful domestic violence in CPO statutes, women subjected to
multifaceted abuse are able to enter a courthouse and seek a legally
enforceable redefinition of their relationship with the person
perpetrating the abuse. Studies confirm that when women subjected
to abuse encounter system actors who "listen, consider and respond to
their needs," the women are less at risk of re-assualt. 192
Unsurprisingly, the importance of autonomy and agency is almost selfevident once we return to a definition of domestic violence that is based
on a series of actions taken to dominate another and to eradicate one's
agency. 193 As Professor Martha Fineman has written, "we must begin to
think of autonomy as possible only in conjunction with the meaningful
and widespread attainment of equality."194 The civil legal system should
strive to provide a forum for women seeking equality. One study shows
that women sought CPOs to regain control in their lives and equality in
the relationship, by making the abuse public and placing the abuser on
notice that the behavior was under public scrutiny.195 According to that
study, women turned to the legal system to regain some of the power they
felt they had lost as a result of the abuse. 196
POL'y &: L 465, 469 (2003); GERALD T. HOTALING &: EVE S. BUZAWA, VICTIM
SATISFACTION WITH CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASE PROCESSING IN A MODEL COURT SETTING 32

(Apr. 2003) (noting whether or not women were satisfied with domestic violence
criminal justice system depended on control: control over criminal justice system;
batterer and what he would do in future; and stopping violence when it happened»;
Waul, supra note 100, at 65 (finding that women "use the CPO process to send a
message to the offender that his behavior will not be tolerated").
191 Kuennen, supra note 26, at 30.
192 Kuennen, supra note 15, at 43.
193 Goldfarb, supra note 22, at 1494 ("In order to counteract the harm of domestic
violence, the law's response should focus on shifting power and control back to the
victim." (citing Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of
State Intervention, 113 HARV. L REV. 550,597-609 (1999»).
194

MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY

29 (2004).
195 Strack &: Hyman, supra note 64, at 42.
196 Id. ("The protection order becomes an announcement that the abused woman
refuses to "take it" anymore and is acting on her own behalf."') (internal citation
omitted).
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If, however, domestic violence is defined as only physical harm or
crimes, then domestic violence is firmly situated in a realm where
society is satisfied with a societal interventionist approach, dictated by
society's goals and values rather than the women's. In the early
battered women's movement, advocates believed that
[blattered women's rights to self-determination, including the
decision to leave or stay with their husbands, were to be
respected; if sexism robbed women of control over their lives,
Women's AdvocatesL an early shelter in St. Paul, MN,] would
work on methods for returning it, even if no one quite knew
how. 197
This ultimate goal of empowerment was needed to counteract the
undermining of agency that is at the core of all domestic violence.
The original drafters of CPO laws intended to provide vehicles that
would promote victim autonomy. 198 And although commentators
have stated that CPO laws "have proven to be tools that can
Significantly facilitate the achievement of the [goal of autonomyl,"199
as discussed above, this goal is often undermined by the failure to
recognize all forms of abuse to which women are subjected.
Accordingly, by recognizing domestic violence as including all
forms of abuse as part of the complex dynamics of intimate
relationships, the civil legal system may be able to address more fully
the entire spectrum of domestic violence and provide a remedy to all
women subjected to it.
C.

Women Subjected to Abuse Are Excluded from Other Legal Remedies

The third broad category of negative consequences from the narrow
CPO recognition of domestic violence is the domino effect it has in the
area of other civil laws. The misperception that domestic violence is
limited to severe, physically violent crimes has been adopted by other
civil laws that reference CPO laws. The incorporation of CPO law
extends the exclusion of legal recognition of all fundamental domestic
violence harms. As discussed above, the CPO domestic violence
definition fails to remedy all forms of domestic violence. As a result,
women who are subjected to abuse that falls outside the statutory
definition or are otherwise excluded from seeking a remedy are unable
to seek and/or obtain a CPO. Without the CPO, these same women
197
198
199

supra note 81, at 63.
Kuennen, supra note 26, at 7 n.30.
ld.

SCHECHTER,

2009]

Redefining Harm, Reimagining Remedies

1153

can be denied other forms of legal relief affecting their family status,
immigration status, and welfare status, among other effects. This is
because some civil laws that address domestic violence simply crossreference the protective order statute to define domestic violence or
rely upon the CPO itself to prove domestic violence. 200
For instance, many states consider domestic violence as a factor in
custody and visitation determinations. 2ot In the District of Columbia,
for example, there is a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is not
in the best interest of the child if a court finds that domestic violence,
as defined in the CPO statute, has occurred.202 Also, in making certain
custody or visitation determinations, the court is required to make
written findings related to the allegations of domestic violence.203 If
the court finds that one parent has committed domestic violence, a
court may only grant custody or visitation to the abusive parent with
specific, written findings. 204 And the court may only award visitation
to the abusive parent if the court finds that the child and other parent
will be protected from harm.20s The abusive parent must prove that
visitation will not harm the child. 206 But whether there was domestic
violence in the relationship rests upon the CPO's definition of
domestic violence. Looping back to the civil law is common and
makes the CPO laws' view of actionable domestic violence even more
influential. Although many states follow the District of Columbia and
appropriately consider domestic violence in custody determinations,
only a limited strand of domestic violence is usually taken into
account. This, of course, undermines the purpose of considering the
domestic violence in the first place.
Other civil laws may provide their own definition of domestic
violence, but allow evidence of a CPO to prove the necessary domestic
violence. Therefore, a CPO can also control a plaintiffs ability to meet
her burden of proof under such laws. 207

200 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-131.01(1) (2008) (providing use of accrued leave for
domestic-violence-related leave cross-references CPO law for definition of domestic
violence).
201 See Klein &: Orloff, supra note 79, at 954.
202 D.C. CODE § 16-914(a)(2) (2007) (labeling domestic violence as "intrafamily
offense").
203 ld. § 16-914(a-1).
204 ld.
205 ld.
206 ld.
207 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(2)(iv) (2007) (providing that in immigration selfpetition cases, CPO is helpful evidence of necessary domestic violence).
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PROVIDING A REMEDY TO WOMEN SUBJECTED TO ALL
FUNDAMENTAL HARMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

To limit the negative consequences to women, states need to reform
their CPO laws to address all forms of domestic violence. This Part
discusses guidelines for how states can make such reforms, including
models that exist in other laws addressing a broader range of domestic
violence. This Part also addresses concerns about providing a CPO
cause of action for women subjected to all forms of abuse.
A.

Recognizing All Fundamental Domestic Violence Harms

The CPO laws should be amended to address systemic oppression of
women through the use of power and control that includes physical
violence, sexual abuse, psychological abuse, emotional abuse, and
economic abuse. Once the laws adequately provide a cause of action
for all forms of abuse, the laws also need to provide a range of
remedies that the petitioner can craft to address the abuse in the
specific context of the petitioner and respondent's relationship.
As stated earlier, scholars have argued recently for certain amendments
to the criminal law and the civil law.208 Those suggested amendments
address the need for the law to recognize the pattern of violence, the
context of domestic violence, the intent of power and control behind the
domestic violence, and coercive control as a unique form of domestic
violence.
The proposals, however, fall short in providing legal
recognition and a cause of action for those persons who are not subjected
to physical violence or a crime, such as stalking or harassment, and yet
are subjected to the fundamental harms of oppression through
psychological, emotional, and/or economic means alone.
The current failings of CPO laws could be addressed by defining
abuse as physical, sexual, psychological, emotional, and/or economic
abuse. The laws could then incorporate some of the various tactics of
abuse as explored in psychological scales and measurements 209 and by
advocates in their screening for domestic violence. 210 For instance,
examples of qualifying psychological abuse could include repeated
acts of intimidation; threats of physical harm to self, partner or
208 See generally Baker, supra note 12 (proposing new CPO statutory language that
includes coercive control); Burke, supra note 26, at 555-56 (addressing need for
criminal law to require showing of power and control in criminal law); Tuerkheimer,
supra note 26, at 959-63 (discussing new domestic violence crime that considers
pattern of violence within relationship).
209 See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
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children; withdrawal of immigration application; destruction of pets
and property; forced isolation from friends, family, school, and/or
work; sleep interruption; limiting food; controlling petitioner's
movement because of obsessiveness and possessiveness; degradation
through humiliation; and repeated name-calling.2lJ
In addition,
statutes should make clear that domestic violence involving nonsevere
physical violence and crimes such as harassment and stalking should
be taken as seriously as domestic violence that includes severe
physical violence and crimes of battery. The same type of targeted
remedy should be available for all forms of domestic violence.
Moreover, as discussed below, states can look to other civil laws that
recognize psychological, emotional, and economic abuse and use those
domestic violence definitions, such as extreme cruelty or excessively
vicious conduct, as models.2l2 In addition, the statutory language, and
not just legislative intent, should identify that the law is aimed at
abusive behavior that keeps one person in a position of power over the
other person through the use of control, intimidation, or fear.
In terms of remedy, the CPO statutes need to provide additional
remedies that are targeted at the petitioner's actual experience of
multifaceted abuse in her life. For instance, monetary damages should
be available for the injuries to which women are subjected from their
abuse.213 Such monetary damages are not only important for the
resulting harm from physical injuries and the emotional and
psychological abuse, but also can be tailored to address the harm from
economic abuse, which should include preclUSion from seeking
employment, as in Vanessa's case.
It is also important to prOvide a range of CPO remedies so that they
can be context specific. CPO laws will offer the greatest benefit,
therefore, if they provide a remedy that includes a catch-all phrase,
such as "any other relief that would address the domestic violence,"
that permits the woman to seek a remedy crafted to her particular

See supra notes 40-63 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.
m Joan Zorza, Using the Law to Protect Battered Women and Their Children, 27
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, 52-53 (1994) ("The average monthly cost to New York City
domestic violence victims in just medical, counseling and legal expenses was $575.
New York City spends at least $500 million annually as a result of domestic violence
- half of the cost born by New York City employers from reduced work productivity,
greater absenteeism, and high turnover. The average employed battered woman
misses work 18 full days per year and is late for work 60 days a year because of the
violence .... ").
211

212
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situation, her knowledge of the abuse, and her understanding of the
best way to address it. 214
B.

Models from Other Civil Laws

Protective orders are not the only civil laws that deal with domestic
violence; a sampling of some other laws follows. Immigration, welfare,
tort, and divorce laws recognize domestic violence that is broader than
only severe physical violence and crimes. Many of these laws recognize
that domestic violence is usually situated in a relationship permeated
with oppressive power and the exercise of control. These laws do
provide civil remedies for domestic violence that occurs within a
relationship and is comprised of any combination of psychological,
emotional, economic, sexual, and/or physical abuse. This demonstrates
that it is therefore possible to reframe our understanding and remedying
of domestic violence in the legal system.
These laws, however, are applicable in only very discrete areas and
provide targeted relief toward that area, such as immigration or
welfare. They do not provide the same type of expedited and flexible
injunctive, family, and monetary relief that CPOs are intended to
provide. Accordingly, this section discusses these other laws as
examples of broader standards that can be imported into CPO laws so
that all women subjected to domestic abuse are able to obtain a
comprehensive and expedited CPO remedy to assist in rearranging
relationships that contain abuse.
l.

Immigration and Welfare

The Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA"),215 enacted in 1994, is
federal legislation that addresses violence against women in a large
spectrum of areas. One of the provisions focusing on immigrant
women is the self-petition mechanism that provides an alternative to
the more common family-based, spouse-sponsored petition to become
a legal permanent resident. 216 The self-petition process permits a
spouse of a u.s. citizen or lawful permanent resident to petition
without a sponsoring spouse if she can demonstrate that she has been
subjected to domestic violence.217 This process implicitly recognizes

214 Klein & Orloff, supra note 79, at 912-14 (discussing catch-all provisions in
CPO statutes).
215 VAWA of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
216 8 U.s.c. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) (2008); id. § 1154(a)(l)(B)(ii)(I).
217 ld. § 1154(a)(l)(A)(iii)(I)(bb).
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the need to provide autonomy to such spouses due to the power and
controlling nature of domestic violence.218 To qualify for self-petition,
one needs to show that she is the spouse of a u.s. citizen or lawful
permanent resident and "has been battered or has been the subject of
extreme cruelty perpetrated by the spouse."219 "Extreme cruelty" has
been interpreted through regulations, decisions by the Board of
Immigration Appeals, and the federal courts as including
psychological abuse. 220
Similar to the self-petition immigration law, federal welfare law has
included various waivers to certain eligibility requirements if an
individual can show that she was subjected to domestic violence. For
instance, under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, "states [may] adopt the Family Violence
Option (FVO), which would allow them to exempt a family from the
act's Sixty-month cap on state benefits 'if the family involves an
individual who has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty."'221
In Maryland, for example, the domestic violence necessary for the
FVO includes mental abuse. 222 Accordingly, using the language of

218 See Kelly, supra note 71, at 695 (stating that VAWA fundamentally recognizes
that domestic violence is about control and therefore battered immigrant women need
petitioning power to escape control).
219 8
U.s.C § 1154(a)(l) (A) (iii)(I); id. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I); 8 CF.R. §
204.2(c)(l)(i)(E) (2008); id. § 204.2(c)(1)(vi).
220 Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824, 839 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that "extreme
cruelty" encompasses acts that may not appear violent but are nonetheless part of
pattern of domestic violence, such as husband's continued pattern of controlling
behavior by promising to seek marriage counseling and to end violence and pleading
for her to leave her safe haven in United States); BIA decision, Case No. A75900716
Gan. 20, 2006) (on file with author) (discussing and adopting "extreme cruelty"
standard under self-petition law as meaning extreme mental cruelty despite case being
cancellation of removal under 8 U.s.C § 1229(b)(2)). Prior to such interpretations, it
is important to note that early critics of VAW A were concerned that "in qualifying for
VAWA, public record evidence of physical abuse is recognized as the most credible
documentation." Further, early critics noted that "[wlhile VAWA allows a battered
woman to seek relief based on 'mental cruelty,' there is no articulation in the
regulations as to what evidence or standard will support a 'mental cruelty' claim. Such
an omission compounds the risk of limiting VA WA to claims of physical abuse."
Kelly, supra note 71, at 695. It is important to note that the regulations indicate that
CPOs constitute helpful evidence in proving the domestic violence. 8 CF.R. §
204.2(c)(2)(iv). Accordingly, as noted earlier, this is another place in which the
narrow definition of domestic violence in CPO laws circumscribes women subjected
to domestic violence in accessing other legal remedies.
221 SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 198 n.67 (citing 42 U.s.c. §608(a)(7)(C)(i) (1996)).
222 COMAR 07.03.03.02(17)
(2008) (defining domestic violence to include
"mental abuse").
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extreme cruelty, immigration and welfare laws provide women
subjected to abuse a possibility of a remedy for nonphysical abuse in
these very specific legal areas.
2.

Tort

Tort law also recognizes a remedy for the broad spectrum of
domestic violence, including physical harm, battery, threat of physical
harm, and assault, as well as emotional harm, such as intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 223 Courts, under equitable powers,
have ordered injunctions against harassing, molesting, assaulting,
battering, embarrassing, and/or humiliating behavior between intimate
partners. 224 Abusive actions do not need to rise to the level of criminal
activity or physical harm for a court to take jurisdiction over a
restraining order case resting on tort. 225 Even the Restatement
(Second) of Torts recognizes that "[olne who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress,
and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm.,,226 Yet even though tort law recognizes the broad spectrum of

223 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS § 302, at 821 (2000) ("Courts have long
recognized that tortfeasors should be responsible for causing distress, emotional harm,
anxiety, diminished enjoyment, losses of autonomy, and similar intangible harms.").
224 ANN MARIE BOYLAN &: NADINE TAUB, ADULT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL,
LEGISLATIVE AND EQUITABLE ISSUES pt. 2, at 5 (Wash., D.C., Legal Servs. Corp. Research
Inst. Sept. 1981) (citing study that documented these court actions).
225 Id. at 7 (citing Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1972))
(internal citations omitted). For general discussions about intentional infliction of
emotional distress cases between spouses, see Brandi Monger, Case Note, Family Law
- Wyoming's Adoption of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Marital
Context. McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162 (Wyo. 2001),2 WYO. L. REV. 563, 571-75
(2002); Tiffany Oliver, Note and Comment, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Between Spouses: New Mexico's Excessively High Threshold for Outrageous Conduct, 33
N.M. L. REV. 381, 384-86 (2003); Meredith Taylor, Comment, North Carolina's
Recognition of Tort Liability for the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress During
Marriage, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1261, 1267 (1997).
226 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
The tentative draft for the
Restatement (Third) of Torts keeps this language. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 45 (Tentative Draft 2007) (stating in its tentative draft
that "[aln actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional disturbance to another is subject to liability for that emotional
disturbance and, if the emotional disturbance causes bodily harm, also for the bodily
harm"). In addition, the Restatement (Third) of Torts further evidences the modern
trend to remedy emotional harm, even absent physical harm, by stating that
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abuse as actionable and compensable, there are difficulties in bringing
these claims, making it all the more important that the CPO law
recognize all forms of abuse. 227
3.

Divorce

Traditional divorce laws, with their fault grounds of cruelty and
excessively vicious conduct, also provide a helpful model of laws that
recognize the multifaceted nature of domestic violence. 22B For

[aln actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional disturbance to
another is subject to liability to the other if the conduct: (a) places the other
in immediate danger of bodily harm and the emotional disturbance results
from the danger; or (b) occurs in the course of specified categories of
activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is
especially likely to cause serious emotional disturbance.

Id. § 46.
227 See Buel, supra note 90, at 945-46, 982-93. It should be noted that there are
some reforms being enacted that provide greater hope for the tort cause of action. Id.
at 1023. Specifically, in California the legislature found that there should be tort
liability and the full panoply of legal and equitable remedies for abuse perpetrated by a
domestic partner. Id. Similarly, the Illinois Gender Violence Act, which includes
physical aggression, sexual assault, and threats, provides a civil cause of action and
relief against a perpetrator. Id. at 1023-24.
228 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 7-103(a)(7), (8) (West 2007). For an
amicus brief that was cited favorably by the Ninth Circuit in Hernandez v. Ashcroft, see
Brief for National Immigration Project, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, and
Family Violence Prevention Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, LuisHernandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003)
(No. 02-70988), available at http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.orglDVPagel
Laura_Hernandez_9th_Cir_extreme_cruelty_2002.DOC (citing follOwing examples of
"extreme cruelty" as defined in divorce cases: McFall v. McFall, 136 P.2d 580, 582
(Cal. Ct. App. 1943) (social isolation as cruelty); Veach v. Veach, 392 P.2d 425, 429
(Idaho 1964) (domination as course of conduct as cruelty); Christenson v.
Christenson, 472 N.W.2d 279, 280 (Iowa 1991) (high speed car chase is "domestic
abuse"); Perret v. Saacks, 612 So. 2d 925, 926-27 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (alarming
spouse by falsely reporting illness of family member); Knuth v. Knuth, 1992 Minn.
App. LEXIS 696, at *2 (Ct. App. 1992) (stalking as cruelty); Boniek v. Boniek, 443
N.W.2d 196, 197-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Robinson v. Robinson, 722 So. 2d
601,603 (Miss. 1998) (limiting social interactions as cruelty); Richard v. Richard, 711
So. 2d 884, 886 (Miss. 1998) (untrue and insulting accusations as cruelty);
Muhammad v. Muhammad, 622 So. 2d 1239, 1241-42, 1248-49 (Miss. 1993) (forcing
religion on spouse as cruelty); Keller v. Keller, 763 So. 2d 902, 904 (Miss. Ct. App.
2000) (demanding custody of child as cruelty); Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, 717 So. 2d
1284, 1286 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (cruelty finding on basis of stalking behavior);
Gazzillo v. Gazzillo, 379 A.2d 288, 291 (N.]. Sup. Ct. 1977) (limiting family
interactions as extreme cruelty); Pompa v. Pompa, 259 A.D.2d 338, 338 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999) (untrue and insulting accusations as cruelty); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 216 A.D.2d

1160

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 42:1107

instance, one case stated that "'cruelty' ... encompass [es] mental as
well as physical abuse [and] ... includes any conduct ... which is
calculated to seriously impair the health or permanently destroy the
happiness of the other."m In Das v. Das, for example, the court found
that the husband subjected the wife to cruelty when he made her stay
up all night, controlled her, taunted her, isolated her from friends and
family, and subjected her to physical violence. 23o Das and other
cruelty cases around the nation 231 show that courts in the divorce
context are able to identify and remedy domestic violence in forms
other than simply physical violence. Not all women who are abused,
however, are married. Even if married, not all women who are abused
seek a divorce. Therefore, divorce laws alone are insufficient; the CPO
potentially provides an invaluable legal cause of action for all women
subjected to abuse.
4.

Summary of Other Civil Laws

As seen above, immigration, welfare, torts, and divorce laws
recognize abuse other than physical abuse or crimes. By including a
broad definition of domestic violence, these laws provide more women
in varying types of abusive relationships with the ability to seek a civil
remedy specific to their situation. They recognize that all forms of
abuse are harmful to women and should be remedied. But none of
these laws provide the expedited and targeted range of remedies that a
CPO does to address abuse. As such, the laws described above
provide useful models for how a broader definition of domestic

648, 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (stalking is cruelty); Gascon v. Gascon, 187 A.D.2d
955, 955 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (illegally monitoring spouse); Richardson v.
Richardson, 186 A.D.2d 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (regularly prohibiting spouse to
sleep with lengthy arguments as cruelty); Harshbarger v. Harshbarger, 1993 Ohio
App. LEXIS 3125, at *3 ( Ct. App. 1993) (isolating spouse by limiting telephone
access part of cruelty finding); Hybertson v. Hybertson, 582 N.W.2d 402, 405 (S.D.
1998) (forcing religion on spouse as cruelty); Osman v. Keating-Osman, 521 N.W.2d
655, 657 (S.D. 1994) (breaching marriage contract and making false promises»; see
also Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing Hostility and Conflict After
Divorce, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441,463 n.99 (2008) (citing Linda D. Elrod &
Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Century Ends with Unresolved
Issues, 33 FAM. L.Q. 865, 911 ch. 4 (2000) (identifying that at least 32 states continue
to have fault grounds, including cruelty».
229 Das v. Das, 754 A.2d 441, 458-59 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (citing Schein en v.
Scheinen, 89 A.2d 609, 612 (1952) (citations omitted».
230 Id. at 461-62.
23I See supra note 228.
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violence in CPOs can be successful while underscoring the necessity
of the CPO remedy.
C.

Confronting Concerns

This Article has addressed how the narrow definition of domestic
violence in CPO laws has perpetuated a narrative of domestic violence
as only severe physical violence or crimes and how this limited
narrative hurts women. Despite the fact that one-third of the state
laws and other civil laws, like immigration, welfare, torts, and divorce,
address broader forms of abuse, there are concerns about expanding
the CPO domestic violence definition to include all women subjected
to abuse.232
Perhaps the most pressing concern about expanding the civil legal
recognition of domestic violence to include psychological, emotional,
and economic abuse is that it might make actionable the nagging of
one's partner. 233 And because CPOs can be used as proof in divorce,
custody, and visitation cases, there is a concern that abusive partners
might bring unjustified nagging claims as a way to further control
their spouses by obtaining custody of their children. This concern
should be taken very seriously and should be appropriately addressed
in the statutory language. It would disserve women to harm them
further with a revision of the CPO law. The concern of nagging as
actionable may be addressed, at least in part, by the success of
psychological researchers in using scales and measurements to
distinguish between women who are subjected to psychological abuse
and those who are not. 234 With those tools, legislatures can similarly
craft statutes that exclude routine conflict while making the serious
harms of psychological, emotional, and economic abuse actionable. In
addition, it might be helpful if social science research could study
whether and to what effect nagging-type claims are brought in those
states where CPO laws cover some form of psychological or emotional
abuse or where divorce laws include emotional abuse in a cruelty fault
ground. Such research could actually inform a discussion of the risks
of false claims from this Article's proposal.
In addition to the "actionable nagging" issue, there is a concern that
batterers might further abuse women by obtaining unwarranted
protective orders against victims with unsupported claims of
232 Email discussion with various domestic violence advocates (on file with
author).
233

Id.

234

See supra text accompanying note 39.
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psychological, emotional, and economic abuse. 235 As a result, victims
would be revictimized by batterers and courts. 236 This is a real
concern. It is certainly possible that more women could be dragged to
court by allegations of emotional or psychological abuse, with the risk
of unwarranted CPOs being issued against them and possible arrests
for CPO violations. An understanding of these risks could be
enhanced with research about whether and how claims of
psychological, emotional, and economic abuse are made in those
jurisdictions where such claims are permitted. The prevalence of and
reasons for any misuse of these causes of action that can be learned
through research could then be weighed against the potential benefits
of an expanded recognition of domestic violence. Currently, this
information is not generally available in published caselaw.
Another concern is that broadening the definition of domestic
violence might delegitimize or trivialize all forms of domestic
violence.237 As discussed above, judges and other system actors
already discount actionable forms of domestic violence and such
discounting hurts women who suffer from domestic violence.
Including additional forms of abuse that the courts do not want to
hear about or that courts see as interference in private relationships
could exacerbate this problem. One possible way to address this
concern is to ensure that the new CPO laws explicitly address the
equality of all forms of abuse, as they are all tools of the exerted power
and control. Another way is to have the new laws clarify that because
of the harmfulness of all forms of abuse, all types of domestic violence
need to be remedied based on the woman's experience of the abuse.
By recognizing and remedying all forms of domestic violence, a new
discourse may emerge regarding the many interconnected
fundamental harms of domestic violence and the importance of
remedying all of them.
There is also a concern that state legislatures will be reluctant to
pass new laws that fail to link domestic violence to crimes, physical
harm, or fear of physical harm, believing it will lead to imaginary, but
actionable, harmsYs It is true that physical violence, with its visible
injuries, such as cuts, scrapes, wounds, and bruising, is more verifiable
than emotional or psychological abuse, which tends to rely on either
petitioner's word or respondent's. It is also true that going outside the

m Email discussion, supra note 232.
236 ld.
237 ld.
238 ld.
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realm of crimes places the courts in the seemingly private realm of the
family. Nonetheless, it is possible that by raising the issue in the
legislature, society could begin an educational process about all
fundamental harms of abuse, commit to redress its harms, and
construct a new narrative about domestic violence.
As a whole, the concerns addressed above need to be weighed
against the continuing negative consequences that occur from the
current limited legal narrative of domestic violence. By maintaining a
focus on severe physical violence alone, advocates, lawyers, and judges
perpetuate the excluSionary narrative that prioritizes resources for
victims of severe physical violence. 239 More often than not, the
severely beaten woman, as opposed to the emotionally abused woman,
is seen as more worthy of time and effort, despite the real harm the
latter also suffers.
Perhaps the continued narrative of severe physical violence feeds
into our collective consciousness about the worthiness of saving the
victims that society has defined as victims. 240 Severe physical violence,
underscored by bruises, cuts, and other injuries, seems undeniable and
indisputable. In contrast, the legal system has historically discounted
the credibility of psychological and emotional harm claims because "if
we can't see it, it can't be true." Society also feels more comfortable
labeling physical violence as outside the permissible boundaries clearly wrong and therefore "domestic violence." On the other hand,
we are uncomfortable drawing a line of impermissible emotional,
psychological, and economic abuse because we fear labeling "good"
citizens as perpetrators of domestic violence. HI When we fear a broad
legal recognition of domestic violence because it might create another
tool for batterers and the courts to revictimize the victims, perhaps we
construct a false sense of control over the phenomenon of domestic
violence. That is, there is a sense that if we can rein in the definition
of abuse, we can altogether eradicate the abuse. We might believe that
controlling remote possibilities of battering is more important than
providing a remedy for victims. Or perhaps we distrust the legislature
and courts to draft and enforce legal standards that could be
discriminating and keep out mere nagging complaints. In the end, the
239 In addition, Kohn has documented that service providers see a victim of
domestic violence as worthy of services if she was a victim of a crime and cooperates
in the system's efforts to protect her. Kohn, supra note 64, at 203 n.55 (citing Reneee
Romkens, Law as a Trojan Horse:
Unintended Consequences of Rights-Based
Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALEJ.L. &: FEMINISM 265, 286 (2001)).
240 Goodmark, supra note 26, at 28-30.
241 SCHNEIDER, supra note 20, at 65.
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concerns about a broad recognition of domestic violence seem to be as
related to how we as a society perpetuate the exclusion of women
subjected to nonphysically violent abuse as they are to how we as a
society might assist all women who suffer abuse.
CONCLUSION

Currently, the domestic violence civil legal system fails women
subjected to certain forms of abuse. In general, the system has
constricted its recognition to primarily crimes and severe physical
abuse. As a result, many women have no CPO cause of action to
address and seek redress for the real and harmful abuse to which they
are subjected. Women like Kim do not believe they have any right to
a remedy for emotional abuse because it differs from the physical
abuse that is labeled "domestic violence." Yet, social science research
indicates that domestic violence is harmful in all of its many forms
because it effectuates the abuser's exertion of power and control. The
forms may be phYSical, sexual, psychological, emotional, or economic.
All of these should bear the name of domestic violence and should be
remedied under the CPO laws.
A broader and more accurate definition of domestic violence would
allow the civil legal system to be a better tool for fostering the agency
of women subjected to abuse. Petitioners would be able to use the
civil legal system to craft the best remedy to address the abuse in their
relationship and counter the power and control of all forms of
domestic violence. If the CPO laws were to effectuate women's goals,
the civil law and the legal system could assist women to cope with the
domestic violence in their lives. 242 With reform, CPO laws' purpose of
addressing abuse and issues of equality might actually be fulfilled for
all women subjected to abuse.

242 GOODMAN &: EpSTEIN, supra note 179, at 94-95 ("[Pjarticipants who reported
feeling in control of the process of working with service providers were far more likely
to rate the services they received as helpful and to use them again. (Zweig, Burt, &:
Van Ness, 2003). Similarly, a study within the criminal justice system found that
victims who chose not to report recidivist abuse to officials were those who felt they
had 'no voice' in a previous prosecution (Hotaling &: Buzawa, 2003) ... , Women ...
will be safer if given the opportunity to maximize their own agency .... "); see also
Baker, supra note 12, at 50-57 (citing few studies showing CPOs' effectiveness in
decreasing phYSical abuse).

